It would be a fundamental error, if we were to maintain, that _religion_ has nothing to do with the regulation of our conduct towards one another,--as parents, as children, as magistrates, subjects and citizens; but that it has left all that field of duty to be regulated by the individual preferences of men. It has not done so. Social duties come as really within the field of _religious_ obligation, as any other duties. "The fifth commandment requireth the preserving the honor and performing the duties belonging to every one in their several places and relations, as superiors, inferiors, and equals." As men, in any relationship we hold, neighbors, citizens of the state, children, parents, or any other earthly connection, religion extends its authority over us; and our conduct in each one of these relationships constitutes a part of our holiness or our sin. God has not seen fit to enact special or particular laws for us, to regulate our conduct in all respects, as here associated with one another, and owing duties to one another, as neighbors, citizens of the commonwealth, husbands, wives, and children. He has himself enacted only _general_ laws for us,--laid down great general principles, under the authority and light of which, he has left men to regulate the particulars as they please, by the governments which they establish.--only not contravening his great general principles and laws. He has himself made _all_ the laws which are needful, and all which can be justly obligatory upon us in respect to _divine worship_,--such duties as praise, prayer, preaching the gospel, and observing the sacramental ordinances;--and no human authority may either repeal these laws or add to them. But in respect to the duties which we owe to our neighbor, that is, to our fellow-man, in any relation he holds to us or can ever hold; God has left the most of these duties to the authoritative decision of human governments. He has thus made a difference betwixt these two classes of duties. The reason for this difference seems to be this; namely, man's wisdom can reach farther in ascertaining what is fit or right betwixt him and his fellow-man, than in ascertaining what is fit or right betwixt him and his God: and consequently, man can legislate in respect to property, and other matters of human right, but not in respect to prayer, and other matters of the first class of duties. Moreover, in respect to worship, God is himself one of the parties. The parties are not man and man, as they are in all social duties; but they are man and God:--and therefore, it would seem but fit and natural, that God should legislate _exclusively_ in respect to the duties which we owe to _Him_, and more specifically, than in respect to the duties which we owe to one another. Hence, we find it so. Explicit divine law regulates all the _particulars_ of the one class of duties; the _particulars_ of the other class of duties are left to human law, or the regulations of human society.