[Footnote 51: Elliot's Debates, V. 487.] [Footnote 52: Ibid., V. 487.] [Footnote 53: Appendix B, No. 7.] [Footnote 54: Elliot's Debates, III. 277.] [Footnote 55: Ibid., III. 182.] [Footnote 56: Ibid., III. 401.] [Footnote 57: Ibid., III. 428.] [Footnote 58: Ibid., III. 335.] CHAPTER II. _LEGISLATION FROM 1789 TO 1850._ § 16. Effect of the fugitive slave clause in the Constitution. § 17. The first Fugitive Slave Act (1793). § 18. Discussion of the first act. § 19. Propositions of 1797 and 1802. § 20. Propositions from 1817 to 1822. § 21. Period of the Missouri Compromise (1819-1822). § 22. Status of the question from 1823 to 1847. § 23. Canada and Mexico places of refuge. § 24. Status of fugitives on the high seas. § 25. Kidnapping from 1793 to 1850: Prigg case. § 26. Necessity of more stringent fugitive slave provisions. § 27. Action of Congress from 1847 to 1850. § 28. Slavery in the District of Columbia. § 29. The second Fugitive Slave Act (1850). § 30. Provisions of the second Fugitive Slave Act. § 31. Arguments for the bill. § 32. Arguments against the bill. =§ 16. Effect of the fugitive slave clause in the Constitution.=--By obtaining in the Constitution the insertion of a clause requiring the return of fugitives, a great step for the advancement of the interests of slavery had been taken. For this embodiment in the Constitution ever afterward formed a basis for the slaveholder's argument that the Constitution recognized and defended slavery, and was a justification to Northern men in their support of the later fugitive slave laws. Although the clause did not in terms apply to the Territories, the Ordinance of 1787 was, on August 7, 1789, confirmed in terms which by implication continued the sixth article, including the rendition of slaves;[59] and in the earliest treaties made by the United States with Indian tribes, under the new Constitution, the return of negroes was expressly required.[60] [Sidenote: The First Fugitive Slave Act.] =§ 17. The first Fugitive Slave Act (1793).=--For some time, however, the provision of the Constitution remained unexecuted; and it is a striking fact that the call for legislation came not from the South, but from a free State; and that it was provoked, not by fugitive slaves, but by kidnappers. The case seemed to suggest that an act of Congress was necessary, more definite in conditions and detail than the provision of the Constitution. A free negro named John was seized at Washington, Pennsylvania, in 1791, and taken to Virginia. The Governor of Pennsylvania, at the instigation of the Society for the Abolition of Slavery, asked the return of the three kidnappers; but the Governor of Virginia replied that, since there was no national law touching such a case, he could not carry out the request.[61]