Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
They could not be compared directly, and therefore
we included them in a total conception, the mere analysis of which
enabled us to discover the relation sought for. The conception does not
give this relation; it only shows it; for if the conception of the two
figures compared were more perfect, so that we might intuitively behold
the relation existing between the increment of the sides and the
decrement of their distance from each other, we should see that there
is here a constant law, which supplies on one side what is lost on the
other; and consequently we should discover, in the very conception
of the rhomboid, the fundamental reason of the equality, that is,
the permanent value of the surface, notwithstanding the greater or
less obliquity of the angles; thus obtaining what we deduced from the
above comparison, and generalize with reference to two constant lineal
values, base and altitude. The same would happen with respect to the
equivalence of all variable quantities differently expressed, could we
reduce their conceptions to such clear and simple formulas as those of
apparent functions; for example, nx/mx, from which, whatever the value
of the variable, there always results the same value of the expression,
which is constant, to wit, n/m.
288. Let not these investigations be imagined useless. In this, as
in many other questions, it happens that most important truths are
the result of a philosophical problem which, in appearance, is merely
speculative. Thus, in the present case, we observe Kant explaining the
principle of causality, in an inexact, and, as we understand him, in an
altogether false sense; but, perhaps, the origin of his equivocation
lies in his considering the principle of causality as synthetic,
although _a priori_, whereas it must be regarded as analytic, as we
shall show when treating of the idea of cause.
In consideration of the great importance of clear and distinct ideas
on the present subject, we will in a few words, sum up the doctrine we
have explained concerning mediate and immediate evidence.
There is immediate evidence when, in the conception of the subject, we
see its agreement or disagreement with the predicate, without requiring
any other means than mere reflection on the meaning of the terms.
Judgments of this class are with propriety called analytic, because we
have only to analyze the conception of the subject to find therein its
agreement or disagreement with the predicate.
There is mediate evidence when, in the conception of the subject, we do
not immediately see its agreement or disagreement with the predicate,
and therefore have to call in a middle term to make it manifest.
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