Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
The reason of this is that the sensation of motion is essentially
a successive sensation, and this succession exists equally whether
the hand moves or the object. Let us suppose the hand to pass along
an object of a varied surface, we shall experience the variety of
sensations corresponding to the surface; suppose now that the hand
remains motionless, and the object passes under it with the same
velocity, pressure, and friction, the sensations will be the same as
before. Every one must have observed that when leaning on a slippery
object, it is often difficult to tell whether it is the object which
moves, or ourselves. Therefore touch also confirms what we have
advanced, that the distinction between the motion of the member and
that of the object does not arise from simple sensation.
88. In this respect, therefore, touch does not help sight; let us see
if sight alone can enable us to distinguish between the motion of the
eye and that of the object. We have already observed that a single
sensation with respect to one object only is insufficient, but there
is no difficulty in proving that this result may be obtained by the
comparison of different sensations.
Let us suppose the eye at a point A, looking at an object B; the object
will appear at the extremity of the range of the sight as if projected
on a plane. To be more definite we will imagine the object B to be
a column in the middle of a large hall, and the point A a corner of
the same hall. The column will appear to the eye to be a part of the
opposite wall. If the eye changes its position, the column will appear
in another part of the wall; so that if the eye should pass around the
column, it would appear successively on every part of the wall. The
same succession of phenomena would be observed if the eye should remain
fixed and the column should move around it; for it is evident that if
the observer is placed in the centre of the room, and the column moves
around him, the column will appear on all the parts of the opposite
wall. From this we infer that only one sensation of sight, with only
one object, is not enough to determine whether the eye moves or the
object.
But if instead of one object we suppose several moving simultaneously,
it is easy to see how the distinction of motions arises. Let us suppose
that at the same time that the eye sees the column, it also sees
other objects, such as chandeliers, statues, or other columns, placed
between the eye and the opposite wall. If the eye moves every time the
column changes its position on the opposite wall, the other columns,
the chandeliers, statues, everything in the room seems to change its
position; whereas, if the column moves and the eye remains fixed,
the column alone changes its position, while everything else remains
motionless. Therefore sight alone gives us two distinct orders of
phenomena of motion:
I. The first, in which all the objects change their position.
II. The second, in which one object only changes its position.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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