Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
86. In the same manner if the motion of the object and that of the
eye are simultaneous, but of unequal velocity, we perceive only the
difference; that is to say, if the motion of the eye be represented by
3 and that of the object by 5, the motion of the object will appear as
2, or the difference between 5 and 3. If our motion is more rapid than
the motion of the object, although in the same direction, the object
will appear to move in the opposite direction, as when we sail down a
river faster than the current, the water seems to flow backwards. An
immovable object at the same time seems to move in a direction opposite
to our own with greater velocity than the current; for, here also, of
the two motions we perceive only the difference. The motion of the
boat, which is equal to 5, seems transferred to the fixed object, which
appears to move in the opposite direction with the velocity represented
by 5; and if we suppose the velocity of the current to be equal to 3,
it will have the appearance of moving backwards with a velocity of 5-3,
or 2.
87. From these considerations it would seem to follow that although
sight is sufficient to give us the idea of motion, it is not
sufficient to enable us to distinguish our own motion from that of the
object, but for this we have need of touch. But this is not so; for by
sight alone, we can distinguish the motion of the eye from that of the
object, and if in some cases this is impossible, the same is true of
touch.
We must observe that in the above examples touch is of much less use
than sight in order to preserve us from illusions. How by the aid of
touch alone could we perceive the motion of a boat gliding smoothly
down a river? Sometimes by the help of sight we observe this motion,
especially if we regard the objects along the bank which we pass; but
touch is essentially limited to what affects the body immediately, and
therefore cannot discover motion when the body is not affected by it.
It is also well to observe that we do not refer the motion perceived by
touch to the objects around us until after we have acquired this habit
by means of repeated comparisons. When for the first time the hand is
passed over an object, we are unable to tell whether the hand moves
over the body, or the body under the hand.
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