Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
"Whence, then," he adds, "is it that I do not call him extended and
corporeal? It is because there is an extreme difference, as I have
already remarked, between attributing to God all that is positive in
extension, and attributing to him extension with a limit or negation.
_He that places extension without limits changes extension into
immensity_; he who places extension with limits, makes a corporeal
nature." From these words it might be believed that Fenelon did not
distinguish the two modes of being of extension as theologians do; but
he gives to God all that is positive in extension, though he gives
it to him without limit. From this it would seem to follow that God
is really extended, although his extension is infinite. With all the
respect due to the illustrious shade of one of the greatest ornaments
of the Catholic Church, and one of the greatest men of modern times, I
must say that such an opinion does not seem to me to be sustainable. A
God really extended though with an infinite extension is not God. That
which is extended is essentially composite; God is essentially simple.
Therefore, God and extension are contradictory.
74. But let us hear the illustrious prelate continue the explanation
and defence of his opinion. He says: "From the moment that you place
no limit to extension, you take from it figure, divisibility, motion,
and impenetrability;--figure, because this is only a mode of limiting
by surfaces;--divisibility, because, as we have seen, that which
is infinite cannot be diminished, therefore, it cannot be divided,
and consequently, it is not _composite_ and divisible;--motion,
because, if you suppose a whole, which has no parts nor limits,
it cannot move beyond its place, because there can be no place
beyond the true infinite; neither can it change the arrangement and
situation of _its parts_, because it has _no parts_ of which it is
composed;--impenetrability, in fine, because impenetrability can only
be conceived by conceiving two limited bodies, one of which is not the
other, and cannot occupy the same space as the other. There are no two
such bodies in infinite and indivisible extension; therefore there is
no impenetrability in this extension. These principles established,
it follows that all that is positive in extension is in God, although
God has no figure, is not movable, divisible, or impenetrable, and
consequently is not palpable, nor measurable."
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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