From this passage it is very evident that Fenelon was far from imagining a composite God, a God with parts. He expressly denies it more than once in these few lines. Not less was to be looked for from his deep penetration and the purity of his doctrines; but, although this saves the rectitude of his intention, it does not satisfy philosophical exactness. For my part, I honestly confess that if extension is to be taken in its true sense, I cannot conceive how taking away its limits destroys its parts. On the contrary, I should rather say that an infinite extension would have infinite parts. If it is infinite it will have no figure; because figure involves a limit; but if it be true extension, it is a sort of immense field on which all imaginable figures may be traced. It will have no essential figure of its own, but it will be the recipient of all figures, the inexhaustible sea from which they all arise. That which is traced in it, will be in it; the points which terminate the figures must be in it. Is not this to have parts, composition? Infinite extension could have no figure, not because it has no parts, or is simple, but because it has infinite parts, because its composition is infinite. I agree that an infinite extension would not be divisible, if by dividing, is meant separating; because in that immense fulness everything would be in its position with infinite firmness. So also we imagine space, the place of all motion, with its parts immovable, the field of all separation, with its parts inseparable; but we are treating of division, not of separation. If there is true extension, it is divisible; we conceive space with its parts inseparable, but still divisible; for we measure them, count them, and it is by relation to them that we form an idea of the size, distance, and motion of bodies.