Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2) — John Shaqi
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 1 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
55. If we observe our impressions received through sensation, we shall
perceive that they are all equal so far as the production of certainty
is concerned. We are just as certain of the sensation caused by any
noise whatever, as we are of that produced by an object which we see,
an odorous body which we smell, a savory morsel which we taste, or any
thing which strongly affects our sense of touch. There is no gradation
in the certainty produced by these sensations: they are all equal; for
if we speak of sensation itself, we experience it in such a manner as
to leave no uncertainty; and if we speak of the relation of sensation
with the existence of the object causing it, we are just as certain
that the sensation called _sight_ corresponds to an external object
_seen_, as we are that an external object _touched_ corresponds to the
sensation called _touch_.
Hence we infer that no one sensation is the origin of the certainty
of other sensations; in this they are all alike: and most men have no
other reason than their experience why they should be sure of this
certainty. We are aware that what happens to individuals from whose
eyes cataracts have been removed, shows that simple sensation does not
suffice for the due appreciation of the object perceived, and that
one sense aids another: but this does not prove any one of them to be
preferable; for as the blind man, whose sight was suddenly restored,
did not form an exact judgment as to the size and distance of objects
seen by sight only, but required the assistance of touch; so is it
very probable that if a person of good eyesight had been deprived
from his birth of the sense of touch, he would not be able, were this
sense given him suddenly, to form an exact judgment concerning objects
touched, until, by the aid of sight, he had become accustomed to
combine the new and the old order of sensations, and learnt by practice
to determine the relations of sensation with its object, or to know by
sensation the properties of its object.
56. This fact of the blind man is however contradicted by others which
lead to a directly opposite result. The youth, upon whom the oculist,
Jean Janin, performed the same operation, and other persons blind from
their birth, whose eyesight Luigi de' Gregori partly restored, did not,
like the blind man of Cheselden, deem these objects stuck to their
eyes, but that they saw them as things really external and separate.
Rosmini thus relates it,[3] although he gives the preference to the
Cheselden case, which he says was repeated in Italy by the professor
Giacomo di Pavia with precisely the same results.
[3] _Saggio sull' origine delle idee_, p. 5, c. iv., tr. 11, p. 285,
where he cites the theoretico-chemical observations on the cataracts
of those born blind, by Luigi de' Gregori, professor of chemistry and
opthalmia, published at Rome in 1826.
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