Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
112. Essence is not distinguished from existence even in finite
beings. It is a distinction in conceptions, to which there is no real
distinction corresponding.
113. The identity of essence with existence does not involve the
necessity of finite things. The arguments by which some pretend to
establish this consequence are founded upon an ambiguous meaning of
words.
114. Kant's opinion, which limits the idea of reality, and that also of
negation, to the purely sensible order, would destroy all intelligence,
since it overthrows the very principle of contradiction. This doctrine
of the German philosopher is also in opposition with what he himself
taught concerning purely intellectual conceptions, distinct from
sensible representations. When he refers the ideas of reality and
negation to that of time, as the primitive form of the inward sense,
he leaves out of the idea of reality what no less pertains to it, and
presents the idea of time under a point of view wholly equivocal.
115. As sensible representation is based upon the finite intuition
of extension, so the perceptive faculties of the pure understanding
receive the idea of being as their foundation. In the same manner
that extension is presented to sensibility as limitable, and from
limitability results figurability, and consequently all the objects
of geometrical science; so also does the idea of not-being, combined
with that of being, fecundate in a manner the metaphysical sciences.
The parallelism of the two ideas, extension and being, is not of such
a nature as to render the former independent of the latter. So far
as science is concerned, the idea of extension is sterile, if it be
not combined with the general idea of being and not-being. This may
be shown in many ways; but it will suffice to recollect that geometry
cannot take a single step without the principle of contradiction, into
which the ideas of being and of not-being enter.[24]
[24] See L. IV., C. V.
116. All our cognitions flow from the idea of being and not-being,
combined with intuitive ideas. We shall have occasion in the following
books to remark this admirable fecundity of an idea, which, although it
cannot of itself teach any thing, can yet, when united with others, and
modified itself in various ways, so illuminate the intellectual world
as to merit to be called the object of understanding.
BOOK SIXTH.
UNITY AND NUMBER.
CHAPTER I.
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS ON THE IDEA OF UNITY.
1. Before analyzing the idea of number, let us examine its simplest
element, unity. Number is a connection of unities. We cannot know what
number is, if we do not know what unity is.[25]
[25] See L. V., C. X.
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Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2) — John Shaqi
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