Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
2. What is unity? When is a thing one? We all seem to know what unity
is, since upon it we found the fabric of all our arithmetic cognitions.
We all know when a thing is one, and we never equivocate on the meaning
of the word. In this the learned and the unlearned stand on the same
footing. The word _one_, in our language, has only one meaning for
all who understand it. The same may be said of the word which in
other languages expresses the same idea. When we meet the figure 1,
which corresponds to this idea, and expresses it in a general manner,
abstracting the difference of idioms, all men understand and apply it
in the same manner.
3. The idea of unity is the same in all men; it is a common patrimony
of the human race. It is not bound to this or that object, nor to this
or that act of the mind; it extends to all in the same manner. Even
composite and multiple things are called one only, inasmuch as they
participate in a general idea. The indivisible point is one. The line
composed of many points could not be one were there not a contiguous
enchainment of these points, and did they not all unite to form _one_
object, which gives us _one_ impression, and is submitted to _one_ act
of our understanding.
4. The idea of unity is not a particular sensation, since it applies
to all; neither is it sensation in general, since it pertains to
what is not sensation. The sensation of color is one; so, also, the
consciousness of the _me_ is one, although this is not a sensation.
The size of the rectangle which I see is one, and the relation of the
equality of its angles is also one, but is not a sensation.
5. The idea of unity is a simple idea, and accompanies our mind from
its first steps; we find it everywhere, and understand it well, but
cannot explain it as we would, because it is simple, and cannot be
decomposed and expressed by various words. We do not mean to say,
however, that we must abjure all explanation of it; we only propose to
warn the reader of the kind of explanation he may expect, which can be
no other than the analysis of the fact, inasmuch as it is an object,
and of the phenomenon as presented to our mind.
CHAPTER II.
WHAT IS UNITY.
6. The scholastics were right in teaching that every being is one, and
that whatever is one is being. Unity is a general attribute of every
being, but is not distinct from it. However little we reflect, we
cannot fail to perceive that unity and being are not distinguished:
the unity of unity, by itself, offers us nothing real or even possible.
What then would become of unity, if nothing but unity? This idea is
involved in that of being; it is an aspect of it, a reason under which
being is presented to the understanding.
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