Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
IV. The idea of the triangle is the same to the man born blind and
to him who has sight; and the proof of this is that both, in their
arguments and geometrical uses, develop it in precisely the same
manner. The representation is different, for us it is a picture,
which it cannot be for the blind man. When he meditates upon the
triangle he neither has, nor can have, in his imagination, the same
sensible representation as we, since he wants all that can relate to
the sensation of sight. If the blind man experiences any accompanying
representation of the idea, he can have received it only from the
sense of touch; and in the case of large triangles, the three sides of
which cannot be touched at the same time, the representation must be a
successive series of sensations of touch, just as the recollection of a
piece of music is essentially a successive representation. With us the
representation of the triangle is almost always simultaneous, excepting
the case of exceedingly large triangles, much larger than we usually
see, in which case, especially when we are unaccustomed to consider
such, it seems necessary to go on extending the lines successively.
20. What has been said of the triangle, the simplest of all figures,
may with still greater reason be said of all others, many of which
cannot be distinctly represented by the imagination, as we see in
many-sided figures; and even the circle, which for facility of
representation rivals the triangle, we cannot so perfectly imagine as
to distinguish it from an ellipse whose foci are only at a trifling
distance from each other.
CHAPTER IV.
THE IDEA AND THE INTELLECTUAL ACT.
21. Having shown that geometrical ideas are not sensible
representations, we can safely conclude that no kind of ideas are.
Could there be a difficulty concerning any, it would be concerning
geometrical ideas, for the objects of the latter can be sensibly
represented. When objects have no figure, they cannot be perceived by
any of the senses; to speak in such a case of sensible representations
is to fall into a contradiction.
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