Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
Extension consists essentially of parts; whence it happens that we
never encounter real unity or simplicity in the corporeal world as
object of our sensibility. But as the composite must be resolved
into the simple, as it is hard to proceed _ad infinitum_, we infer
that the corporeal universe itself is a union of substances which,
whether called points without extension, or any thing else, cannot be
decomposed into others; for which reason they are really one, or simple.
18. Hence we conclude that substances may be said to be in a certain
manner simple; and that things called composite are unions of
substances, which in their turn form a third substance by virtue of
a law presiding over them and giving them that unity which we call
factitious.
19. We cannot, then, do less than to remark that the transcendental
analysis refutes those who deny simplicity to thinking beings, since we
have seen that simplicity is prior to composition, which can neither be
nor be conceived if it be not presupposed. Simplicity is a necessary
law of every being: a composite being ought to be called a union of
beings, rather than a being.
20. We have said that simple substances are not objects of our
intuition, which has none worthy to be called simple excepting the
acts of our mind. The reason of this is, that the principal medium of
our intuition is sensibility, which is founded upon representations,
themselves based upon extension. There can be no doubt that the acts
of our mind, given us by intuition, in the inward sense are perfectly
simple; for who can decompose a perception, a judgment, an act of the
reason or of the will?
21. The perception of a certain object requires preparatory acts;
and the same may be said of judgments and ratiocinations; yet these
operations are in themselves exceedingly simple, and cannot be divided
into various parts. Simplicity is met with alike in the acts of the
will, whether of the pure, intellectual, or sensible will. How shall we
divide such acts as these into parts: _I desire_, _I do not desire_, _I
love_, _I abhor_, _I suffer_, _I rejoice_?
22. We must take care not to confound the multiplicity of the acts with
the acts themselves; there may be many acts, but in themselves they are
simple. Thoughts, impressions and affections continually succeed one
another in our mind; these phenomena are all distinct from each other,
as is proved by their existing at different times, some at one time
without the others, and by some being incompatible with others, because
contradictory; but each individual phenomenon is by itself incapable of
decomposition, and admits in itself no distinction into various parts;
wherefore, it is simple.
23. True unity, therefore, is only found in simplicity; where there is
no true simplicity, there may be factitious, but not real, unity; since
even when there is no separation, there may be distinction between the
various parts of which the composite is formed.
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