24. It may be inferred from this that _indistinctum_ ought, perhaps, to take the place of _indivisum_ in the definition of a one being; because distinction is opposed to unity of identity, and division to union. Absence of division is all that factitious unity requires; but real unity demands that there be no distinction. However closely united two things may be, if one is not the other they are distinct, and cannot, in strict metaphysical language, be called one. 25. The object of these observations is only to fix our ideas, not to modify our language. In common parlance, the idea of unity is used in a less rigorous sense, and, far from opposing this use, we readily accord it a reasonable foundation. There results from the union of two really distinct things, a conjunction, rightly called one so far as it also is subjected to a certain unity; and, were it not permitted to use this word in a sense less rigorous than that exacted by metaphysical analysis, we should be under the necessity of excluding unity from the great mass of objects. Simple substances, we have said, are not offered to us in immediate intuition, and we see compositions rather than their component elements. Could we apply unity only to simple elements, science would be greatly reduced, language would be impoverished, and literature and the fine arts would be despoiled of unity, one of their characteristic perfections. CHAPTER IV. ORIGIN OF THE TENDENCY OF OUR MIND TO UNITY. 26. Since we encounter multiplicity in all sensible objects, which are those chiefly demanding our attention, how does our mind acquire the idea of unity? In science, in literature, in the arts, and in every thing, we seek unity; and whence this irresistible tendency towards unity, which makes us seek a factitious when we cannot find a real unity, and this, too, notwithstanding the multiplicity presented by all the objects of our perception? 27. Two origins, if we mistake not, may be assigned to this tendency towards unity, the one objective, the other subjective. The former consists in the very character of unity in which the object of the understanding is mainly comprised; the other is the unity found in the intelligent being, and which it experiences in itself. We will explain these ideas more at length.