Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
In vain would you undertake to move space; you can only move yourself
in it, or survey its various points. Its points are all fixed; you
may mark out distances and directions with respect to them, but you
cannot change them. The result will be analogous if you attempt to move
time. The present instant is not the one just past, nor the one next
to succeed; they are of necessity distinct, and of necessity exclude
each other. Their very nature is to succeed each other. If their place
be changed with respect to time, it ceases to be the same. Imagine,
if you can, that to-morrow is to-day, that to-day is yesterday. It
is impossible for that which was at a certain time not to have then
been; but this would not be impossible if time could be moved; for in
order that what was yesterday may not be, it is necessary to convert
yesterday into to-morrow; but this would be an absurdity. The past, the
present, and the future, are essentially distinct things.
A simple space, a space without parts, is no space at all, it is a
contradiction; neither is a simple time, a time without parts, a time,
but is a contradiction.
A space whose parts are not continuous, is not a space; neither is
a time whose parts are not continuous, a time. The parts
of space are inseparable; you may distinguish them one from another,
count them one after the other, compare them one with another, and
consider them one after another, but you cannot separate them. All
imaginable bodies may exist in the apartment where we write, one or
many, at rest or in motion; but the space which we conceive is one,
fixed, and always the same; we can estimate its extent in cubic feet,
if we choose, but these feet are fixed and inseparable; we cannot
separate one cubic foot from another, even if we would; for even while
we annihilate it, it is present to us, and in the same distance that we
need in order to conceive separation. We cannot conceive separation,
if we do not conceive distance; nor conceive distance, if we do not
conceive space. We separate bodies from each other, but not one space
from another. Space remains with the same continuity when bodies are
separated, and it is by this continuity remaining unalterable that we
measure the extent of their separation. The same happens with time; it
is a chain which cannot be broken. Can we conceive three successive,
immediate instants, A, B, C, and then suppress B? Certainly not; such
a suppression would be impossible, or it would be a poor diversion.
We destroy B in our caprice, and A and C are continuous; since being
only separated by B, when it disappears the extremes meet. But in this
case it is no longer A, but B, for B is the instant which precedes C.
We have no other distinction than that of priority with respect to C,
and continuity with A. When, then, by the imaginary disappearance of
B, A is brought into contact with C, it is converted into B. Moreover,
A is not only connected with C, but is preceded by others; if, then,
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account