Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
by the disappearance of B, it makes a step, so also must the whole
infinite chain which precedes it. Each one is then a soldier, or rather
no soldiery is possible, for we have taken an instant from the infinite
chain, and so rendered it finite. Or, more distinctly; can we conceive
yesterday or to-morrow without to-day, a future or a past without the
present? Evidently we cannot. Time, then, is essentially composed of
inseparable parts.
19. This similarity between time and space naturally leads us to
believe that time is an abstract idea just as space is. What we have
said of space is applicable to time, only with a few modifications
exacted by the very nature of the thing. It can in no case be without
utility, in scientific investigations, to approximate and compare
these great ideas, which are as immense receptacles wherein our mind
deposits its treasures. The actual corporeal universe, and all possible
universes, are included in the idea of space; and all finite beings,
corporeal or incorporeal, are included in that of time.
20. We may well suspect that these ideas, so intimately united to our
perceptions, are formed in a similar manner; for it is probable that
they belong to the order of those primitive laws which govern the
development of our intellect.
21. The similarity between space and time must not make us ignore the
differences which distinguish them.
I. All the parts of space are co-existent; otherwise, that continuity
which is essential to them, would be inconceivable. Time is composed
of successive parts; to imagine them co-existent, is to destroy the
essence of time.
II. Space refers solely to the corporeal world, under only one aspect,
that of continuity. Time extends to all that is successive, corporeal
or incorporeal.
III. Consequently, the idea of space exists only in the geometrical
order, of which it is the basis. The idea of time is mingled with every
thing, and more especially with our own acts.
IV. Our soul, when reflecting upon itself, can totally prescind space,
and forget all its relations with extended objects; but it cannot
prescind time, which it finds necessary even to its own operations.
This last difference is a great help to the understanding in what the
idea of time consists; and we venture to recommend it to the attention
and memory of the reader.
CHAPTER IV.
DEFINITION OF TIME.
22. Time is duration; but duration without something which endures, is
an absurdity. There can then be no time without something existing. The
duration which we conceive, after reducing every thing to nihility, is
a vain imagination; it is not an idea, but is rather in contradiction
with ideas.
An important consequence flows from this; it is, that time in itself,
cannot be defined with absolute elimination of every thing to which it
refers. Time, then, has no proper existence; and separated from beings
is annihilated.
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