52. The same experience teaches that what is the limit of some things is not the limit of others, and that the limit applied to one object must be denied of another. When we compare different beings together, we frequently find ourselves _denying certain_ limits. As our understanding has the faculty of generalizing, it is evident that we may conceive in general the negation of _certain_ limits, and form an indeterminate conception, including the two ideas of _negation_ and _limit_. 53. I do not see what objection can be made either to the possibility or to the existence of this conception; but as this fact is necessary for the explanation of the idea of infinity, I shall make some further observations for the purpose of confirming it. We have an idea of negation in general; this is a primitive fact of our mind: without it no negative judgments would be possible, nor could we even know the principle of contradiction. It is impossible for any thing to be _and not be_ at the same time; when we say _not be_ we express a negation, we therefore have the conception of negation. This conception is general, because it involves no determination; we speak of not-being without applying it to any particular object, nor even to any determinate species or genus. Therefore the conception of negation is general and absolutely undetermined. 54. We have the idea of limit; for, as we have seen, it is a negation applied to a being. We have also the idea of the negation of limit; for just as we conceive the limit as applied or applicable, we may and do conceive it as not applied or not applicable. At every moment we deny certain limits; this idea generalized becomes the negation in general of limit in general. 55. After these remarks we may establish what is contained in the idea of the infinite. This idea is a general conception involving the conception of being in general, and the negation of limit in general. The union of these two conceptions constitutes the abstract idea of the infinite. 56. The general conception of the negation of limit gives us an idea of infinity in the abstract, but not any infinite thing. Without the intuitive cognition of an infinite object, and with only a very imperfect idea of it, we may speak of infinity without falling into contradiction, and determine the cases in which it may be applied to a being or to an order of beings, whether real or possible. Man has many ideas of this vague kind, which nevertheless answer his necessities. We shall make this palpable by examples.