Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
57. Suppose we take an uneducated person and point out to him a number
of learned men, telling him that one of them knows more than all the
rest. The uneducated person has no idea of what the man knows who
knows the most, nor the man who knows the least; he has no idea of the
degrees of science, nor of what science itself is; but he possesses the
general ideas of degree, of more and less, and also of knowledge, and
this enables him to speak, without contradiction or confusion, of the
greater science of the one and the less science of the others, and even
to solve with certainty the questions concerning the science of those
individuals, in so far as these questions are contained in the general
idea that the science of one is greater than that of all the others.
A servant in an establishment where the most beautiful products of
art are collected, may speak of them all without contradiction or
confusion, although he may be incapable of knowing their merit, and
entirely ignorant of the circumstances which constitute the beauty of
the objects. It is sufficient for him to have the idea of perfection
or beauty in general, and to arrange by certain arbitrary signs the
degrees of perfection or beauty of the objects, in order to be able
to point them out to visitors, and talk of the greater skill of one
artist, the poorer success of another; the greater effect and value of
the works of the former, and the inferiority of those of the second,
and to make other remarks of a similar nature, which at first might
make us suppose him a consummate artist, or, at the least, an amateur
of a great intellect and exquisite taste.
58. It would be easy to show by other examples, how fruitful some
general ideas are, and how they may undergo innumerable combinations,
without presenting any thing determinate to the intellect. This is
precisely what happens with the idea of the infinite: in vain we ask
what there is within us which corresponds to it: the conception of
being in general and of the negation of limit present nothing fixed,
except certain abstract conditions to which we continually reduce the
objects which come under our intuition, or are presented to us with
certain characteristic properties which permit us to form a less vague
idea of the negation of limit.
CHAPTER VIII.
THE DEFINITION OF INFINITY CONFIRMED BY APPLICATION TO EXTENSION.
59. We have explained the idea of infinity in general, by the
indeterminate conceptions of being and the negation of limit. In order
to assure ourselves that the explanation is well grounded, and that we
have pointed out the essential marks of the conception, let us examine
whether their application to determinate objects corresponds to what we
have established in general.
If the idea of infinity is what we have defined it to be, we may apply
it to all objects of sensible intuition or of the pure understanding,
and we shall obtain the results which we ought to obtain, including the
anomalies already referred to.[38]
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