Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
40. Geometrical ideas, such as we conceive them, have a necessary
relation to sensible intuition. In order the better to understand
this relation, let us define the triangle to be the figure enclosed
by three right lines. This definition involves the following ideas:
space, enclosed, three, lines. With a space and three lines which
do not enclose the figure, we have no triangle; the word _enclosed_
cannot therefore be omitted. If you enclose a space, but with more than
three lines, the result will not be a triangle; and if you take less
than three lines you can have no enclosure. The idea of _three_ is
therefore necessary to the idea of the triangle. It is useless to add
that the idea of _line_ is as necessary as the others, since without
it no triangle can be conceived. Different and distinct ideas, it is
true, are here combined, but they are all referred to one sensible
intuition, although in an indeterminate manner. We here abstract
the longness or shortness of the lines and their forming larger or
smaller angles. But we cannot thus abstract in the case of determinate
intuitions; for every determinate intuition has its own peculiar
qualities; otherwise it would not be a determinate representation, and
consequently not sensible as it is supposed to be. But although the
reference be to an indeterminate intuition, it always supposes some
intuition either actual or possible, since otherwise the material of
combination would be wanting to the understanding; and the four ideas
involved in the triangle would be empty and unmeaning forms, and their
combination extravagant if not absurd.
41. The idea then of the triangle seems to be simply the intellectual
perception of the relation between the lines presented to the
sensible intuition, considered in all its generality, without any
determining circumstance limiting it to particular cases or species.
This explanation admits nothing intermediate between the sensible
representation and the intellectual act, which, exercising its activity
upon the materials presented by sensible intuition, perceives their
relations, and this pure and simple perception constitutes the idea.
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