"The _me_ supposes absolutely, without any foundation, and under no possible condition, the _absolute totality of reality_, as a quantity, than which, by virtue of this supposition, none greater is possible; and this absolute maximum of reality it supposes _in itself_. All that is supposed in the _me_ is reality: and all reality that is, is supposed in the _me_.... * * * * * ... "The conception of reality is similar to the conception of activity. All reality is supposed in the _me_, is the same as: All activity is supposed in the _me_, and reversely; all in the _me_ is reality, is the same as: The _me_ is _only_ active; it is the _me_ only in so far as it is active; and in so far as it is not active, it is the _not-me_."[57] [57] Ib., D., pp. 137-8. "Only in the understanding is there reality; it is the faculty of the _actual_; _in_ it the ideal first becomes real."[58] [58] Ib., Deduction der Vorstellung, III., pp. 233-4. "The _me_ is only that which it supposes itself; it is infinite; that is, it supposes itself infinite.... "Without the infinity of the _me_,--without a productive faculty whose tendency is unlimited and illimitable,--it is impossible to explain the possibility of representation." 139. Let us give a glance at these ravings. Psychology starts from a fundamental fact--the testimony of consciousness. The human mind cannot think without finding itself; the starting-point of its psychological investigations is the proposition, I think; in this is found the identity of which Fichte speaks--the _me_ is the _me_. All thought, from the first moment that it exists, perceives itself subject to a law; the perception of every thing involves the perception, either explicit or implicit, of the identity of the thing perceived. In this sense, the most simple formula in which we can express the first law of our perception is: A is A; but this formula is as sterile as it is simple; and it is impossible to conceive how any one could pretend to raise upon it a system of philosophy. This formula, supposing it to be enunciated, involves the existence of the _me_ which enunciates it. It cannot be said that A is A, if there is not a being in which the relation of identity is supposed. If the proposition A = A is true, it is necessary to suppose an A, or a being in which it exists. A purely ideal truth, without any foundation in a real truth, is an absurdity, as we have elsewhere proved and explained at great length.[59] [59] See Bk. IV., Chs. XXIII., XXIV., XXV., XXVI., and XXVII.; and Bk. V., Chs. VII. and VIII.