140. But the existence of an ideal truth, _in so far as it is represented in us_, that is to say, in so far as it is a fact of our consciousness, is not necessary, but hypothetical, it exists when it exists; but when it exists it may not exist, or when it does not exist it may exist. Necessity cannot be inferred from existence: the testimony of consciousness assures us of the fact; but in this consciousness we find no proof that the fact is necessary, that it has not depended on a higher agent; quite the contrary, the sentiment of our weakness, the shortness of the time to which the recollections of our consciousness extend, the natural and periodical interruptions of them which we experience during sleep, every thing shows that the fact of consciousness is not necessary, and that the being which experiences it has but a little while ago commenced its existence, and might lose it again as soon as the infinite being should cease to preserve it. The _me_ which we perceive within us knows itself, affirms itself; the word _supposes_ itself has no reasonable meaning, unless it mean that the _me_ affirms its existence; but this knowing itself is not producing itself; whoever asserts such an absurdity is under obligation to prove it. 141. In truth it requires all the gravity of Fichte to pretend to connect such a collection of extravagant absurdities into science. It was reserved for modern times to see a man seriously occupied with a system whose existence will, with difficulty, be believed by those who read the history of the aberrations of the human mind. The system of Fichte is already judged by all thinking men, and there is no surer means to make it forgotten than to expose it to the eyes of the judicious reader. 142. Having established the necessary and absolute existence of the _me_, Fichte proposes to demonstrate that from the _me_ proceeds the _not-me_, that is to say; all that is not the _me_. "But the _not-me_ can only be supposed in so far as a _me_, to which it is opposed, is supposed in the _me_ (in the identical consciousness). "But the _not-me_ must be supposed in the identical consciousness. "Therefore the _me_ must also be supposed in it in so far as the _not-me_ is supposed in it." ... "If _me_ = _me_, all is supposed which is supposed in the _me_.... "The _me_ and the _not-me_ are both products of original acts of the _me_, and the consciousness itself is a product of the first original act of the _me_, of the supposition of the _me_ by itself."[60] [60] Ib., § 3., pp. 106-7.