Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy
Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)
Balmes, Jaime Luciano
Philosophy, Spanish
73. The reason why the sensibility left to itself, renders all its
impressions objective, is to be looked for in the fact, that being a
non-reflective faculty, it cannot distinguish between a purely internal
affection, and one coming from without. Since comparison, however
inconsiderable it may be, always implies reflection, sensibility does
not compare. Hence it happens that when the subject does nothing
but feel, it cannot appreciate the differences of sensations, by
calculating the degrees of their vividness, nor ever perceive the
existence or want of order and constancy in their connection.
The faculty of feeling is perfectly blind to all but its determinate
object; whatever it does not discover in this so far as it is its
object, does in no manner exist for it. We can now see why, when left
to itself, it will render its impressions objective, and believe itself
intuitive by converting simple appearances into realities.
74. It is worthy of notice, that of the sensitive faculties, some
would always be intuitive, that is, would always refer to an external
object, if reflection did not accompany them; whilst others would never
be intuitive, not even if separated from reflection, or unaccompanied
by those which are by their nature intuitive. To the former class
belong the representative faculties, properly so called, that is, those
which affect the sensitive subject by presenting to it a form, the real
or apparent image of an object. Such are those of sight and of touch,
which can neither exist nor be conceived without this representation.
Other sensations, on the contrary, offer no form to the sensitive
subject; they are simple affections of the subject, although they
proceed from an external cause; if we refer them to objects, this we do
by reflection; and when this warns us that we have in attributing to
the object not only the principle of causality, but also the sensation
in itself, carried the reference too far, we easily recognize the
illusion, and lay it aside. This does not occur in representative
sensations; no one, no matter how great efforts he may make, will ever
be able to persuade himself that beyond himself there is nothing real,
nothing resembling the sensible representation in which objects are
presented as extended.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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