Galileo’s enemies founded their assertion on the circumstance that at the end of the work Simplicius employs an argument which the Pope himself had brought forward in repeated conversations in 1624 with Galileo, and on the weight of which he plumed himself not a little.[273] It consisted of the reflection, undoubtedly more devout than scientific, that God is all-powerful, so that all things are possible to Him, and that therefore the tides could not be adduced as a _necessary_ proof of the double motion of the earth without limiting His omnipotence. This pious objection is received by both Salviati and Sagredo with the utmost reverence. The former calls it heavenly and truly admirable, and the latter thinks that it forms a fitting conclusion to the discussion, which opinion is acted upon.[274] The Pope’s argument is thus by no means made to appear ridiculous, but quite the contrary. As to the main point, Simplicius says expressly that “he had this argument from a very eminent and learned personage.” If this means Urban VIII., it is plain that Simplicius cannot be Urban VIII. Q.E.D.[275] In writing his “Dialogues,” Galileo found himself in a difficult position. As he brought forward all the arguments of the disciples of Ptolemy against the new system, the vain pontiff would have been sorely offended if he had not introduced his. But who should mention it, if not Simplicius? Galileo might think that Urban would not perhaps like to see his argument treated as the original suggestion of Simplicius, who did not appear in a brilliant light, and devised the expedient of making him quote it, as that of “a very eminent and learned personage,” whereby he would imagine that he had steered clear of every obstacle. But there was no security against calumny. How little idea Galileo could have had of making Urban ridiculous under the guise of Simplicius appears also from the fact that in 1636, when seeking full pardon from the Pope, and when he would be most anxious not to irritate him, he had just completed his famous work, “Dialogues on the Modern Sciences,” in which Simplicius again plays the part of defender of the ancient principles; and that he published it in 1638, just when, in view of the unfavourable answer of 1636, he was begging at least for the favour of being nursed at Florence. There can be no doubt that this suspicion materially contributed to injure Galileo’s cause. Pieralisi, indeed, makes an assertion as novel as it is untenable, that this bold slander was first heard of in 1635, and therefore not until after the famous trial; and in his book, “Urban VIII. and Gal. Galilei,”[276] he devotes a chapter of forty-six pages to prove this latest novelty. But all his arguments are upset by the following passage by Galileo in a letter to his friend Micanzio on 26th July, 1636:—