General Gatacre: The Story of the Life and Services of Sir William Forbes Gatacre, K.C.B., D.S.O., 1843-1906Gatacre, Beatrix Wickens Davey, Lady
History
General Gatacre: The Story of the Life and Services of Sir William Forbes Gatacre, K.C.B., D.S.O., 1843-1906
Gatacre, Beatrix Wickens Davey, Lady
Gatacre, William Forbes, Sir, 1843-1906; South African War, 1899-1902
Writing on board ship between Capetown and {222} East London, on
November 16, Sir William says:
"I am ordered to go to East London, and take command of the district up
to Bethulie Bridge. Now, what does this mean? Why, that with the
Royal Irish Rifles, which has never been on service before, together
with half-battalion Berkshire Regiment, and a few Volunteers, I become
responsible for the railway line and adjacent country up to the Orange
River, about 200 miles long--but the last 100 miles are much
disaffected. I have no definite orders, except that I am to hold
Queenstown if possible, but East London at any rate, and am to raise as
many Volunteers as possible."
When the General reached East London he found that it could be left
under the care of a local Volunteer Corps, and so he proceeded by train
to Queenstown the same day. Here he found the half-battalion named
above, a small detachment of Royal Garrison Artillery, and half a
company of Royal Engineers. Besides these regular troops there were
229 men of the Frontier Mounted Rifles, and 285 of the Queenstown Rifle
Volunteers.
Sir Redvers Buller, who was the General Commanding-in-Chief, chose
Natal for his headquarters. Sir F. Forestier-Walker was in command of
the Lines of Communication, with headquarters at Capetown. Sometimes
Sir Redvers sent his messages direct to Gatacre, and sometimes they
came through Capetown. There was no friction and no contradiction,
{223} but it may well have been that this duplication of important
telegrams created an atmosphere of unrest and added poignancy to
Gatacre's feeling of helplessness.
On November 18 a telegram was received from Sir Redvers Buller,
pointing out that "the great thing in this sort of warfare is to be
pretty certain that one position is safe before you advance to another,
and that we are not yet strong enough to play tricks."[1]
[1] See _Official History of the War in South Africa_, 1899-1902, vol.
i. pp. 286, 287.
[Sidenote: Conflicting messages]
Three days, later, however, the General Commanding-in-Chief strikes a
different note:
"I calculate it will be at least five days and probably a week before I
have a second battalion to send you, or a battery of field artillery,
but I am anxious to get into a position to protect the Indwe mines
better than we do. Do you think it would be safe for you to advance
your force or part of it to Stormberg, and hold that instead of
Queenstown? I am told it is a good position for a force the size of
yours. Of course you will have no support."[2]
[2] From contemporary copy of telegram in W. F. G.'s own handwriting.
To this Sir William replied that he had not sufficient men as yet to
advance on Stormberg, but as soon as more troops arrived he intended to
occupy that junction and clear the country round it.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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