Germany before the warBeyens, baron (Eugène-Napoléon)
History
Germany before the war
Beyens, baron (Eugène-Napoléon)
Germany -- Foreign relations -- 1871-1918; World War, 1914-1918 -- Causes
We must picture to ourselves, the Belgians will say, a monarch mighty
in rank and power, effusively cordial to strangers whom he wished to
charm and dazzle, but liable to disappoint those who were rash enough
to trust in his kindness of heart; always able to give the impression
of complete frankness, and using this as a means of seduction; really
admiring nothing but strength, and ready to abuse his own; looking
with utter contempt on small States and petty princes, yet never loath
to flatter them when occasion demanded; a wooer of public opinion,
especially that of other countries, but resolved to defy it in order
to attain his ambitions; a ruler who enjoyed a false reputation
for chivalry, while he has shown himself relentless in his malice;
of a faith that was sincere, if superficial, yet did not prevent
him from setting his interests above his most solemn engagements,
and ruthlessly tearing up any treaty that had become inconvenient;
always careful to play his part, and clever in staging his effects;
accustomed, unfortunately, to seeing everything bow to his will; such a
spoilt child of fortune that he came to the point of thinking himself
infallible; one whom Nietzsche might have called a superman, and the
Romans a demigod.
It has been asserted that this “demigod” was merely an exalted type
of the ill-balanced or decadent man. What a mistake! He was in full
possession of all his faculties when he ordered that hasty mobilization
which made the cataclysm inevitable. Some have maintained that he
was, beyond all question, the tool of a caste and a party for whom
war was the sole means of consolidating their power. He did indeed
listen to their advice, but only because their views were in harmony
with his own. Without any hesitation, the verdict of history will
make him answerable for the disasters that have overwhelmed Europe.
If we carefully read and compare the documents relating to the brief
negotiations carried on during the Austro-Serbian crisis, we find ample
proof that it was within William II.’s power, up to the last moment,
to say the word that would have prevented war. So far from doing this,
he sent his ultimatum to Russia, and thus let loose the deluge at the
moment which he had chosen.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account