effect, in case he be called in question for any of his misdeeds, and partly because his courage and strength, and his command of friends and money, enable him to employ force with success, whenever force is required. Such being our unjust man, let us, in pursuance of the argument, place the just man by his side, a man of true simplicity and nobleness, resolved, as Æschylus says, not to seem, but to be, good. We must certainly take away the seeming; for if he be thought to be a just man, he will have honours and gifts on the strength of this reputation, so that it will be uncertain whether it is for justice’s sake, or for the sake of the gifts and honours, that he is what he is. Yes; we must strip him bare of everything but justice, and make his whole case the reverse of the former. Without being guilty of one unjust act, let him have the worst reputation for injustice, so that his virtue may be thoroughly tested, and shewn to be proof against infamy and all its consequences; and let him go on till the day of his death, steadfast in his justice, but with a lifelong reputation for injustice; in order that, having brought both the men to the utmost limits of justice and of injustice respectively, we may then give judgment as to which of the two is the happier.” “Good heavens! my dear Glaucon,” said I, “how vigorously you work, scouring the two characters clean for our judgment, like a pair of statues.” “I do it as well as I can,” he said. “And after describing the men as we have done, there will be no further difficulty, I imagine, in proceeding to sketch the kind of life which awaits them respectively. Let me therefore describe it. And if the description be somewhat coarse, do not regard it as mine, Socrates, but as coming from those who commend injustice above justice. They will say that in such a situation the just man will be scourged, racked, fettered, will have his eyes burnt out, and at last, after suffering every kind of torture, will be crucified; and thus learn that it is best to resolve, not to be, but to seem, just.”[138] The picture of the just man here is surely a very remarkable one. It is dramatically put into the mouth of Glaucon, and part of it is by him attributed to those who commend injustice; but these are but literary forms; the picture is Plato’s own. It is his ideal of the just man; and the extraordinary thing is his belief, here stated so plainly, that a man whose heart is perfectly set on righteousness may be so completely misunderstood by those around him, as to be regarded by them as utterly unjust, and may in consequence be subjected to the extremest torture and the most shameful death.