In influencing His creatures, however, God adapts himself to the peculiar nature of each. The necessary causes He determines to act necessarily, the free causes, freely. All receive from Him their substance and their mode of action.(707) The rational creature, therefore, though subject to His determining influence, acts with perfect freedom, just as if it were not moved. b) In spite of free-will, however, the influence which God exerts on His rational creatures is irresistible because it proceeds from an absolute and omnipotent Being whose decrees brook no opposition. What God wills infallibly happens.(708) Nevertheless, God is not the author of sin. He moves the sinner to perform an act; but He does not move Him to perform a sinful act. The malice of sin derives solely from the free will of man.(709) c) Since the divine influence causally precedes all creatural acts, God’s concurrence with creatural causes (_concursus generalis_) must be conceived as prevenient, not simultaneous. The Divine Omnipotence not only makes the action possible, but likewise effects it by moving the will from potentiality to actuality.(710) Consequently, the causal influence which the Creator exerts upon His creatures is not a mere _motio_, but a _praemotio_,—and not merely moral, but physical (_praemotio physica_).(711) It is by physical premotion that God’s prevenient influence effects the free actions of His creatures, without regard to their assent.(712) Free-will is predetermined by God before it determines itself.(713) d) If we analyse God’s physical predeterminations in so far as they are created entities, we find that they are nothing else than the effect and execution of His eternal decrees, embodied in the _praedeterminatio physica_. It is the temporal execution of the latter that is called _praemotio physica_. Hence we are justified in speaking, not only of a temporal _praemotio_, but of an eternal _praedeterminatio_, in fact the terms are often used synonymously.(714) Viewed in its relation to rational creatures, this eternal predetermination is nothing but a temporal premotion of the free will to determine itself. Since God has from all eternity made absolute and conditional decrees, which possess the power of physical predetermination without regard to the free consent of His creatures, physical predetermination constitutes an infallible medium by which He can foreknow their future free actions, and hence there is no need of a _scientia media_. If God knows His own will, He must also know the free determinations included therein. To deny this would be to destroy the very foundation of His foreknowledge.(715) This is merely the philosophical basis of the Thomistic system. Its champions carry the argument into the theological domain by reasoning as follows: What is true in the natural must be equally true in the supernatural sphere, as we know from reason and Revelation.(716)