Grace, Actual and Habitual: A Dogmatic TreatisePohle, Joseph
Religion
Grace, Actual and Habitual: A Dogmatic Treatise
Pohle, Joseph
Grace (Theology)
β) The Thomists meet this argument with mere evasions. They make a
distinction between _necessitas consequentis_ (_antecedens_), which really
necessitates, and _necessitas consequentiae_ (_subsequens_), which does
not. A free act, they say, necessarily proceeds from a physical premotion,
but it is not on that account in itself necessary. But, we answer, a
_determinatio ad unum_, which precedes a free act and is independent of
the will, is more than a _necessitas consequentiae_—it is a _necessitas
consequentis_ destructive of free-will. The Thomists reply: Considered as
a created entity, physical premotion may indeed be incompatible with
free-will; not so if regarded as an act of God, who, being almighty, is
able to predetermine the will without prejudice to its freedom.(729) The
obvious rejoinder is that an intrinsic contradiction cannot be solved by
an appeal to the divine omnipotence, because even God Himself cannot do
what is intrinsically impossible.(730) He can no more change a
_determinatio ad unum_ into a _libertas ad utrumque_ than He can create a
square circle, because the two notions involve an intrinsic contradiction.
Furthermore, if the Almighty wished intrinsically to compel a man to
perform some definite act, would He not choose precisely that _praemotio
physica_ which, the Thomists claim, also produces free acts? Not so,
replies Alvarez; “for the will remains free so long as the intellect
represents to it an object as indifferent.”(731) That is to say: Liberty
remains as long as its root, _i.e._ an indifferent judgment, is present.
But this new rejoinder, far from solving the riddle, simply begs the
question. Liberty of choice resides _formaliter_ in the will, not in the
intellect, and consequently the will, as will, cannot be truly free unless
it possesses within itself the unimpeded power to act or not to act. This
_indifferentia activa ad utrumlibet_, as it is technically termed, is
absolutely incompatible with the Thomistic _praemotio ad unum_. What would
it avail the will to enjoy the _indifferentia iudicii_ if it had to submit
to compulsion from some other quarter?
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