γ) To escape from this quandary the Thomists resort to the famous distinction between the _sensus compositus_ and the _sensus divisus_. The Molinists argue: “_Liberum arbitrium efficaciter praemotum a gratia non potest dissentire; ergo non est liberum._” The Thomists reply: “_Distinguo:—non potest dissentire in sensu diviso, nego; non potest dissentire in sensu composito, concedo._” They explain this distinction by certain well-known examples taken from dialectics. Thus Billuart says: “_Ut si dicas, sedens potest stare, significat in sensu composito, quod possit sedere simul et stare; ... in sensu diviso, quod sedens sub sessione retinet potentiam standi, non tamen componendi stationem cum sessione. Uno verbo: sensus compositus importat potentiam simultaneitatis, sensus divisus simultaneitatem __ potentiae._”(732) As one who sits cannot at the same time stand (_sensus compositus_), although he is free to rise (_sensus divisus_), so the consent of the will effected by efficacious grace, cannot become dissent (_sensus compositus_), though the will retains the power to dissent instead of consenting (_sensus divisus_), and this is sufficient to safeguard its freedom. Is the distinction between _sensus compositus_ and _sensus divisus_ correctly applied here? Can the will, under the predetermining influence of the _gratia efficax_, change its consent into dissent at any time and as easily as a man who is sitting on a chair can rise and thereby demonstrate that his sitting was an absolutely free act? Alvarez(733) describes the Thomistic _potentia dissentiendi_ as a faculty which can never under any circumstances become active. But such a _potentia_ is really no _potentia_ at all. A man tied to a chair is not free to stand; his natural _potentia standi_ is neutralized by external restraint. Similarly, the will, under the influence of the Thomistic _gratia efficax_, no longer enjoys the power to dissent, and the alleged _potentia resistendi_, by which the Thomists claim to save free-will, is a chimera.