He found but a handful of men, amounting to about two thousand, and these principally militia, with but three days’ provision, and a very short supply of ammunition. In front lay an enemy treble his number, proud in victory, and too strong to be encountered. Before him was a task which he considered hopeless—the recovery of two States already conquered, and the protection of a third. He saw the astounding difficulty he had to encounter—to raise and provide for a dispirited army in a devastated country, having to create resources where they did not exist; to operate with an incompetent force on an extended and broken line of frontier, and to contend with an enemy superior in numbers and discipline. To conduct a warfare like this required a genius of the highest order, combined with indefatigable skill and industry. In order to prepare for such a campaign, Greene’s first care was to provide for his troops subsistence and ammunition. His next was to draw close the reins of discipline, which had been shamefully relaxed, and make both officers and men feel that they had a commander who knew both his duty and theirs, and was resolved that both should be performed. He called no councils of war, studying every question himself, and communicating his intentions to only two or three of his officers whom he trusted most. In a letter to General Hamilton, he says, “If I cannot inspire the army with confidence and respect by an independent conduct, I foresee it will be impossible to instill discipline and order among the troops.”