His next care was to select a position where his troops could be properly trained to the use of their arms, and better and more easily supplied with food; while at the same time it was essential that every step on his part should be a connecting link in his general plan of operations. It must be conceded that much of the moral strength of an army consists in a confidence in its leader, an attachment to his person, and a spirit of subordination founded on principle. To such an extent was this true, that even the common soldiery, sensible of the superintendence of a superior officer, confidently predicted a change of fortune. They felt a solicitude to regain the reputation they lost at Camden under their late commander, and to signalize their prowess under the command of their present one. The main part of the British army was then lying at Winnsborough, between the Broad River and the Catawba, with powerful garrisons in their flank and rear, and Charleston to fall back upon in case of a defeat. Cornwallis, who was at Charleston, receiving continual supplies of both men and provisions from New York, was expected to connect with the part of the army at Winnsborough, and attack the Americans before they could be ready to leave the village of Charlotte. This called for a decided movement of the American army, and Greene resolved to divide his forces, sending one portion to act upon the west bank of the Catawba, to the north of the enemy’s position, and advancing with the other to the Cheraw hills on the frontiers of South Carolina. The first dispatch was about four hundred continentals, under General Morgan, with Colonel Washington’s corps of dragoons, and a few militia, amounting in all to six hundred men. This judicious arrangement, which formed a rallying point for the friends of independence, both in the East and West, also facilitated the procuring of provisions for the troops. General Greene soon began to feel the good effects of this movement; it enabled him to make the most of his little army by compelling his adversary to divide his forces, and leaving him at a loss which way to direct his efforts. By advancing against the American commander, he would expose his posts at Ninety-Six and Augusta, or Morgan, hovering upon his flanks or his rear, might seize the critical moment for aiming a blow in concert with the main army. Cornwallis, on discovering the movements of Greene, and finding that there was no time to be lost, dispatched Colonel Tarlton with a strong detachment, amounting in horse and foot to nearly a thousand men, for the protection of Ninety-Six, with orders to bring General Morgan, if possible, to battle. With numbers greatly superior to Morgan, he advanced with a menacing aspect, and compelled him at first to fall back rapidly. He accordingly continued for a few days to retire before his adversary, receiving at every step new accessions of strength from the inhabitants of the country through which he passed, alarmed by the