Great captains : $b A course of six lectures showing the influence on the art of war of the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick, and NapoleonDodge, Theodore Ayrault
History
Great captains : $b A course of six lectures showing the influence on the art of war of the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick, and Napoleon
Dodge, Theodore Ayrault
Alexander, the Great, 356 B.C.-323 B.C. -- Military leadership; Caesar, Julius -- Military leadership; Frederick II, King of Prussia, 1712-1786; Gustav II Adolf, King of Sweden, 1594-1632; Hannibal, 247 B.C.-182 B.C.; Military biography; Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769-1821 -- Military leade
Among all the brilliant lessons in strategy which Hannibal gave the
Romans, there is time but to mention one more. Capua, one of the large
cities of Italy, had embraced Hannibal’s cause as the coming man. But
Hannibal had--in B.C. 211--been crowded back into southern Italy,
and the Romans were besieging Capua. He was called upon for aid. The
Capuans were in sorry plight. Hannibal, who was blockading the citadel
at Tarentum, left this pressing affair to answer their appeal, made a
secret forced march, eluding the four consular legions in Apulia and
at Beneventum, and suddenly appeared before the astonished Roman army
at Capua,--intent on raising the siege. The Capuans and Carthaginians
attacked the Roman lines at the same time, but both recoiled from
superior numbers and entrenched position. Hannibal, seeing that he
could not raise the siege by direct means, tried, for the first time in
the history of strategy, an indirect means, hoping to effect by moral
weight what he could not by weight of men. He marched straight on Rome.
He counted on the proconsuls, from fear for their capital, to raise the
siege of Capua and follow him. He knew he could not capture Rome, where
were forces much larger than his own. But he ravaged the land to its
very gates and filled the city with affright. Hannibal had, however,
taught his pupils much too well. Rome was terribly demoralized, and
called lustily for the proconsuls’ armies to come from Capua to its
aid. But these generals were not to be misled; they by no means relaxed
their grip, and Hannibal lost the game. At an earlier stage of the war
this brilliant movement would certainly have raised the siege of Capua.
[Illustration: CAPUA B.C. 211]
Finally, Hannibal became so reduced in numbers that he was compelled to
remain in the extreme south of Italy. He could not move out of Brutium.
His forces were quite unequal to fighting, or even campaigning. He was
hoping against hope for some kind of recognition from home, some aid
in men and material. He could undertake nothing, but clung to what he
held with a despairing grasp. Weak as he was, however, no Roman consul
chose to come within reach of his arm. His patience and constancy under
these trials, and the dread his name still inspired, show him up in
far greater measure than any of his triumphs. Even Livy, who is full of
depreciation of Hannibal’s abilities, says, “The Romans did not provoke
him while he remained quiet, such power did they consider that single
general possessed, though everything else around him was falling into
ruin,” and is compelled to follow up this statement with a panegyric.
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