[8] Part of the correspondence is to be found in _Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch_, by Count Mongelas and Prof. Walter Schuking; part in the _White Book_, Nos. 24 and 26. As much acrimonious discussion has arisen over King Constantine's last dispatch, it is worth while noting the circumstances under which it was sent. Vice-Admiral Mark Kerr, Chief of the British Naval Mission in Greece, relates how the King brought the Kaiser's telegram and read it to him: "He was indignant at the interference in his country's affairs. However, to stop such telegrams coming in daily, he determined to send on this occasion a sympathetic answer." (See _The Times_, 9 Dec., 1920.) The communication, therefore, was no secret from the British Government. Nor was it from M. Venizelos; for the King's dispatch is but a summary of an identical declaration made by M. Venizelos's Government itself to the German Government: Streit to Greek Legation, Berlin, 26 July/8 Aug., 1914. Though omitted from the _White Book_, this document may now be read in the _Balkan Review_, Dec., 1920, pp. 381-3. [9] _White Book_, Nos. 28, 29, 30. [10] My authority for this glimpse behind the scenes is M. Streit himself. [11] Deville, pp. 119, 128. [12] _Orations_, pp. 93-4. [13] _Dardanelles Commission_. _Supplement to First Report_, par. 45. [14] Gennadius, London, 20 Aug./2 Sept.; 21 Aug./3 Sept.; 23 Aug./5 Sept.; Romanos, Paris, 16/29 Aug., 1914. [15] _White Book_, No. 31. [16] See _Orations_, p. 103. [17] _Ibid_, pp. 41-2, 98. [18] _White Book_, No. 31. [19] See the Admiral's statements in the _Weekly Dispatch_, 21 Nov., and in _The Times_, 9 Dec., 1920. Though the plans in question were not used, they were among the very few sources of reliable information with which Sir Ian Hamilton left England to take up the command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.--_Dardanelles Commission, Final Report_, par. 17. {17} CHAPTER II Before proceeding any further with the development of the position in Greece, it will be well to cast a glance on the attitudes maintained by the other Balkan States and the views entertained towards them by the Entente Powers. One must know all the possible combinations on the Balkan chess-board before one can profitably study or estimate the real place of the Greek pawn. Bulgaria proclaimed her firm intention to remain neutral; but, to judge from the Greek diplomatic representatives' reports, there was every indication that she only awaited a favourable opportunity, such as some brilliant military success of the Central Powers, in order to invade Servia without risk. Meanwhile, well-armed irregular bands, equipped by the Bulgarian Government and commanded by Bulgarian officers "on furlough," made their appearance on the Servian frontier, and the Bulgarian Press daily grew more hostile in its tone.[1]