Greece and the Allies, 1914-1922Abbott, G. F. (George Frederick)
History
Greece and the Allies, 1914-1922
Abbott, G. F. (George Frederick)
Greece -- Foreign relations; Greece -- Politics and government -- 1913-1917; World War, 1914-1918 -- Greece
If the Allies would give a formal undertaking to guarantee during the
War, and for a certain period after its termination, the integrity of
her territories, Greece would join them with all her military and naval
forces in a war against Turkey, the definite objective of which would
be the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire; for, unless the Ottoman
Empire disappeared, the Greek hold on Smyrna would not be very firm.
It was further stipulated that the Allies should define the territorial
compensations as well as the facilities regarding money and war
material which they would accord Greece in order to enable her to do
her part of belligerent efficiently. On these conditions Greece would
assume the obligation to enter the field as soon as the Allies were
ready to combine their forces with hers. All military details were to
be settled between the respective Staffs and embodied in a joint
Military Convention, with this sole reservation that, if Bulgaria
continued to stand out, the Greek Army's sphere of action could not be
placed outside European Turkey. In an explanatory Note added a few
days later, at the instance of the General Staff, stress was laid upon
the ambiguous attitude of Bulgaria, on account of which the opinion was
expressed that the Allies should be prepared to contribute forces
which, combined with the Greek, would equal the united Turkish and
Bulgarian forces, and that the sphere of Greek action should be limited
to the west of the Gallipoli Peninsula; but it was agreed that, if the
Allies wished it, they should have the military assistance of Greece on
the Gallipoli Peninsula too, provided that they landed their own troops
first.[7]
Of these proposals, which were not put forward as final, but rather as
a basis of discussion, the Entente Powers did not condescend to take
any notice. Only unofficially {37} the Greek Minister in Paris, on
approaching M. Delcasse, was told that, since the Hellenic Government
viewed the Dardanelles enterprise in a different light from them, an
understanding seemed impossible and discussion useless; for the rest,
that enterprise, for which England had desired the co-operation of the
Greeks, was now carried on without them, and the situation was no
longer the same as it was some days before. Alarmed by this snub, and
anxious to dissipate any misunderstandings and doubts as to its
dispositions towards the Entente, the Hellenic Government assured M.
Delcasse that it continued always animated by the same desire to
co-operate and would like to make new proposals, but before doing so it
wished to know what proposals would be acceptable. M. Delcasse replied
that he could not even semi-officially say what proposals would be
acceptable.[8] But M. Guillemin, his former collaborator and later
French Minister at Athens, then on a flying visit there, advised M.
Zographos to abandon all conditions and take pot luck with the Allies.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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