Grounds of Natural Philosophy: Divided into Thirteen Parts: The Second Edition, much altered from the First, which went under the Name of Philosophical and Physical OpinionsNewcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Philosophy
Grounds of Natural Philosophy: Divided into Thirteen Parts: The Second Edition, much altered from the First, which went under the Name of Philosophical and Physical Opinions
Newcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Physics -- Early works to 1800
The Sixth Argument was, _That, put the case it were possible all the
several Parts belonging to one and the same Society; as for example, To
one Human Creature, after his Human Life was dissolved, and his Parts
dispersed, and afterwards, all those Parts meeting and uniting; Whether
that Human Creature would be the same?_
The Minor Part's Opinion was, That it could not be the same Society:
for, every Creature was according to the nature of their Kind or Sort;
and so according to the Form and Magnitude of one of their Kind or Sort.
The Major Part's Opinion was, That though the Nature of every
particular Creature had such Forms, Shapes, and Properties, as was
natural to that sort of Creatures they were of; yet, the Magnitude of
particular Creatures of one and the same sort, might be very different.
The Minor Part's Opinion was, That if all the Parts of one Society, as
for example, a Man, from the first time of his Production, to the time
of his Dissolution, should, after division, come to meet and unite;
that Man, or any other Creature, would be a Monstrous Creature, as
having more Parts than was agreeable to the nature of his Kind.
The Major Part's Opinion was, That though the Society, viz. The MAN,
would be a Society of greater Magnitude; yet, not any ways different
from the Nature of his Kind.
CHAP. VI. Of the Resurrection of Human Kind.
The Seventh Argument, was, _Whether all the particular Parts of every
Human Creature, at the time of the Resurrection, be, to meet and joyn,
as being of one and the same Society?_
The Minor Part's Opinion was, They shall not: for, if all those Parts
that had been of the same Body and Mind of one Man, from his first
Production, to the last of his Dissolution; or, from his Birth, to the
time of his Death, (supposing him to have liv'd long) should meet and
joyn, as one Society, that is, as one Man; that Man, at the time of
his Resurrection, would be a Gyant; and if so, then old Men would be
Gyants; and young Children, Dwarfs.
The Major Part's Opinion was, That, if it was not so, then every
particular Human Society would be imperfect at the time of their
Resurrection: for, if they should only rise with some of their Parts,
as (for example) when they were in the strength of their Age, then all
those Parts that had been either before, or after that time, would be
unjustly dealt with, especially if Man be the best Product in Nature.
Besides, if a dead Child did rise a Man, as at his most perfect Age,
it could not be said, He rises according to a Natural Man, having more
Parts than by Nature he ever had; and an old Man, fewer Parts than
naturally he hath had: so, what by Adding and Diminishing the Parts
of particular Men, it would not cause only Injustice; but, not any
particular Human Creature, would be the same he was.
CHAP. VII. Of the Dissolution of a World.
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