When the _Anthropogeny_ was published Haeckel’s public position became more stormy than ever. In professional circles a number of the embryologists had taken up an attitude of opposition to him; the most heated of them attacked his popular works continually on the ground that he was popularising, not the real results of official science, but his own personal opinions. There was a great deal of truth in that. The only question was, which would stand best with the future, his or their personal opinion? It does not alter the subjectivity of opinions that a few people here and there combine and pretentiously constitute themselves into a “science.” Posterity will deal coolly enough with their collective decisions. It will take every man of science as an individual, and merely ask which of them came nearest to the truth. The name, the official science, will pass into the grave with many titles and decorations. All that will remain in men’s minds is the star of the personality in its relation to the great constellation of contemporary human truth. However, as regards the particular embryological attacks of these opponents, it seems to me to-day especially characteristic that such people are more and more abandoning the idea that it is only a question of contesting certain particular deductions of Haeckel’s _within_ the limits of Darwinism. They find themselves increasingly compelled to throw Darwinism overboard altogether. Instead of its attempts to explain phenomena they are putting forward a confused claim of “direct mechanical explanations,” or relying on the sonorous old phrase, started in 1859, an “immanent law of evolution,” or retreating into a despairing attitude of “I don’t know.” These clearer divisions will make it very much easier for posterity to pass its judgment on the situation. After the embryologists we have a considerable group of opponents on the anthropological side. The objections of these anthropological critics have in the course of time narrowed down to the single argument that no transitional form between man and the ape has yet been discovered. And for many years now this position has not been held on serious scientific grounds, but rather on ingenious and strained hypotheses. Because we now have, in the bones found at Java by Eugen Dubois in 1894, the remains of a being that stands precisely half-way between the gibbon and man. Hence what is called the anti-Darwinian and especially anti-Haeckelian school of anthropology to-day is mainly distinguished for its preference of more risky and more subtle hypotheses instead of plain conclusions from obvious facts. Finally, there is the theological opposition to Haeckel that increased with every book in which he put his ideas before the general public and helped them (in their boundless professional wisdom) to realise the danger of the situation.