I take a walk along the sea-beach, and I find by chance a magnificent diamond. I am thus put in possession of a great ‹value›. Why? Am I about to confer a great benefit on the human race? Have I devoted myself to a long and laborious work? Neither the one nor the other. Why, then, does this diamond possess so much value? Undoubtedly because the person to whom I transfer it considers that I have rendered him a great ‹service›,—all the greater that many rich people desire it, and that I alone can render it. The grounds of his judgment may be controverted—be it so. It may be founded on pride, on vanity—granted again. But this judgment has, nevertheless, been formed by a man who is disposed to act upon it, and that is sufficient for my argument. Far from the judgment being based on a reasonable appreciation of ‹utility›, we may allow that the very reverse is the case. Ostentation makes great sacrifices for what is utterly ‹useless›. In this case, the value, far from bearing a necessary proportion to the labour ‹performed› by the person who renders the service, may be said rather to bear proportion to the labour ‹saved› to the person who receives it. This general law of value, which has not, so far as I know, been observed by theoretical writers, nevertheless prevails universally in practice. We shall explain afterwards the admirable mechanism by which value tends to proportion itself to labour when it is free; but it is not the less true that it has its principle and foundation less in the effort of the person who ‹serves› than in the effort saved to him who ‹is served›. The transaction relative to the diamond may be supposed to give rise to the following dialogue:— “Give me your diamond, Sir.” “With all my heart; give me in exchange your labour for an entire year.” [p141] “Your acquisition has not cost you a minute’s work.” “Very well, Sir, try to find a similar lucky minute.” “Yes; but, in strict equity, the exchange ought to be one of ‹equal labour›.” “No; in strict equity, you put a value on your own services, and I upon mine; I don’t force you; why should you lay a constraint upon me? Give me a whole year’s labour, or seek out a diamond for yourself.” “But that might entail upon me ten years’ work, and would probably end in nothing. It would be wiser and more profitable to devote these ten years to another employment.” “It is precisely on that account that I imagined I was rendering you a ‹service› in asking for only one year’s work. I thus save you nine, and that is the reason why I attach great ‹value› to the ‹service›. If I appear to you exacting, it is because you regard only the labour which I have performed; but consider also the labour which I save you, and you will find me reasonable in my demand.” “It is not the less true that you profit by a work of nature.”