The Belgian delegation, finally becoming alarmed, insisted on formally taking up the question with the Council of Four. The Belgian delegation, under the leadership of Mr. Hymans, Minister of Foreign Affairs, made two chief demands, one for the priority already mentioned, and one for reimbursement for what the war had cost her. To this latter item there was vigorous objection on the ground that it was inadmissible to provide for Belgium's "costs of war" and not for those of England, France, Italy and the other Allies. As a compromise to meet the situation, a formula was finally proposed in a phrase to the effect that Germany was to be obligated especially "to reimburse Belgium for all the sums borrowed by Belgium from the Allies as a necessary consequence of the violation of the Treaty of 1839." Inasmuch as all such sums borrowed by Belgium were used for the prosecution of the war, this phrase was simply a euphemism for granting to Belgium the war costs which she had demanded. But it was finally agreed to on all hands, and the crisis was averted. [Illustration: Copyright by Press Illustrating Service The George Washington It was on this ship that President and Mrs. Wilson made their two trips across the Atlantic and back during the Peace Conference.] THE TREATY PRESENTED TO THE GERMANS AT VERSAILLES The Treaty in its final form was presented to the Germans at Versailles May 7th. The Germans were hoping they would be permitted to discuss certain phases of the Treaty in person with the Allied delegates, and in fact repeatedly requested the opportunity. Some of us believed such conversations might be advantageous if they were held; not between the chiefs of the Allied states and the heads of the German delegation, but between technical experts on both sides. Mr. Wilson favored this view, as tending to enlighten the Germans on certain phases of the Treaty, which from their written communications it was evident they did not understand. We thought that some weeks of delay might possibly be averted by sitting around the table with the Germans, distasteful as that task might be, and holding a kind of miniature peace conference. This suggestion, however, was strongly opposed by M. Clemenceau, although it was favored by some of his ministers. In fact, some of the latter, as well as many of the British, were for a time convinced that the terms of the Treaty were such that Germany would never sign them. Again and again Clemenceau was urged to give way on this point, but he sturdily opposed the view and declared positively that he knew the German character; that the only way to secure a German signature to the Treaty was to insist upon purely formal and written communications. Clemenceau had his way, and then began the laying of a good many wagers as to whether the Germans would sign. This was after the original German delegation, or at least the chiefs of it, had returned to Berlin and declared that they would not come back again to Versailles.