My own opinion was, that after making as great a kick as possible the Germans would undoubtedly sign. The logic of the situation was all for their signing, the reasoning being this: If the Treaty were a just Treaty, then they ought to sign any way; if it were an unjust Treaty, then, even if signed, it would eventually fall of its own weight, and the Germans would run no risk in signing it. I felt that the German psychology of the situation would be acute enough to see these points and to lead to a signature. GERMANY SIGNS THE TREATY This proved to be the case, and on Saturday, the 21st of June, after questionings and misgivings, we finally got the word that the Germans were to sign. I shall never forget the moment that the news came. Some of us were in session with the Council of Four at the President's house. Mr. Wilson sat on the right of the fireplace, Mr. Lloyd George on the left, and M. Clemenceau in the middle. Mr. Orlando was in Italy but his foreign minister, Baron Sonnino, was there in his place. The afternoon was a tense one, for the time was growing short and the Germans had, as I say, not yet signified their intention of signing the treaty. In the mind of every one of us there lurked the question as to the terrible steps that would have to be taken in the event the Germans refused to sign. Late in the afternoon an orderly slipped into the room and whispered into M. Clemenceau's ear. He struggled to his feet, marched up to President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George, and, drawing himself up, said in solemn tones, "I have the honor to announce to you that the Germans will sign the treaty." And then a moment later the cannon boomed forth to the expectant populace the news that the Germans would sign, and M. Clemenceau, turning to me, breathed: "Ah, that is the sound that I have been waiting to hear for forty-eight years." II--WILSON'S FOURTEEN POINTS An Attempt to Raise International Morality to the Level of Private Morality On January 8, 1918, President Wilson outlined the fourteen points on the basis of which the Allies should make peace. This program was the startling climax of a whole series of peace proposals which had kept coming from both camps of belligerents, from neutrals, Socialists, and the Pope. It is without doubt one of the greatest and most inspiring State documents in the history of the world. It struck a vital and telling blow at the basic causes of modern wars. For that reason it electrified into complete unity the masses of the Allied countries. Liberal, radical and pacifist opponents of the war rallied around it as the last great hope of civilization. Its most important effect was to give a democratic basis to the weary and disillusioned masses of the Central Powers who were longing for peace. It was on the basis of the fourteen points that the enemy surrendered. THE WILSON PROGRAM