Harvard Psychological Studies, Volume 2 — John Shaqi
Harvard Psychological Studies, Volume 2
Science
Harvard Psychological Studies, Volume 2
Psychology, Experimental
But we know now where we are standing; we know now that the world
of objects, of psychical as well as of physical, is a constructed
world, constructed for the purpose of satisfying our demand for causal
connection; for that world holds causality because it is the world
seen from the point of view of causality; and just as there cannot be
anything in that world of physical and psychical objects which is not
causally connected, just so it cannot have any meaning at all to ask
for causal connection before the world is conceived in the service of
this artificial construction. Reality in itself is not causal, and to
ask for the causes of the real experience of our inner life has not
more meaning than to ask how many pounds is the weight of a virtue, and
how many inches is the length of our hopes. But we must go farther.
To apply the question of cause and effect to our real will means not
only that we apply to the real object a standard which belongs to
the artificial or constructed object, but it means above all that we
consider as an object something which in reality is not an object at
all. The will which the psychologist describes and must describe, the
will which has causes and which is thus not free, is a will conceived
as an object found in our mind like an idea, something of which we are
aware, something whose happening we perceive, and yet if anything is
sure it is the immediate experience that we are aware of our will in
a way which is absolutely different from the way in which we perceive
objects. We do not perceive our will at all, we will it, we strive
it, we fight it; yes, we feel ourselves, only in so far as we are the
subjects of will. Our will is our personality, which we do not find but
which we are, and which stands opposed and separated by the deepest
gulf from the world of objects. Those objects are means and purposes of
our will, are ends and aims and instruments; but they come in question
for us only as we will them, as we like and dislike them, as we approve
and reject them. And if we take this world of objects and reconstruct
it into the artificial world of physical and psychical things connected
by causality, in this very act of reconstruction we feel ourselves as
willing, deciding, approving, aiming personalities, whose wills decide,
who think the world as causally connected, whose freedom guarantees
the value of our conception of a world not free. There is no knowledge
but in our judgments; there is no judgment but in our affirming and
denying; there is no affirming and denying but in our will. Our will
chooses for its purposes to conceive reality as if it were unfree.
What a climax of confusion to think that this conception of an unfree
world, the conception of science, can itself now condemn the freedom
of the will which has chosen. "Freedom is necessary," said Emerson. We
can add, necessity itself is merely a purpose determined by freedom.
"Intellect annuls fate," Emerson says. We may add, fate is merely an
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