But when the first part of the same report is considered in relation to the second, it is clearly shown that the reaction experiment is not adapted to the finer investigation of this problem. For the first part shows that no matter how much a _motor_ reaction is complicated by choices or other judgments, it always takes place in just about the same time as the simple reaction. The complications may be such as actually to double the reaction time in the case of a sensory reaction, and yet a motor reaction, under precisely the same conditions as far as they may be the same for a motor, shows no increase in time. The "set" of the attention in the motor reaction is, no doubt, such a change in the order of succession of the parts of the process that some of those, which come after the stimulus is received in the case of the sensory reaction, are made to come before the stimulus in the motor. When, however, it is found that the motor response to the question, "Is this the name of a scientist, philosopher, poet, statesman, or musician,--Sappho?" is made by the appropriate finger, as previously agreed upon, in just as short a time as the observer can make a motor response with any finger to a simple auditory stimulus, it indicates, either that the whole of the choice judgment has been made before the stimulus was received, or that the judgment itself is so automatic that it is practically a reflex. This latter cannot be true. The judgment, as conscious choice, cannot be made before the stimulus is given, _i. e._, until the question is completed. And judgment cannot be made automatic and yet be a judgment. In fact both alternatives are untenable, and there is no other course than to hold the situation which gave rise to them at fault. If the judgment process here required previous to the reaction does take time apart from the processes of the simple reaction, the reaction process is shown by these experiments to be unable to exhibit it. A more microscopic method is demanded before the matter can be settled.