Harvard Psychological Studies, Volume 2 — John Shaqi
Harvard Psychological Studies, Volume 2
Science
Harvard Psychological Studies, Volume 2
Psychology, Experimental
On the other hand, I do not know a psychological experiment which
does not need a philosophical background to bring its results into
sharp relief. Of course, you will say, the psychologist deals with
facts, not with theories, and has to analyze and to describe and to
explain those facts. Certainly he has to do all that; only he must
not forget that the so-called "fact" in psychology is the product of
complex transformations of reality. A will, an emotion, a memory-image,
a feeling, an act of attention, of judgment, of decision--these are
not found in the way in which stones and stars are noticed. Even if
I choose perceptions or sensations as material for my psychological
study, and still more when I call them _my_ perceptions and _my_
sensations, I mean something which I have found at the end of a long
logical road, not at its starting-point, and that road certainly leads
through philosophy. Emerson said wisely, "A philosopher must be more
than a philosopher;" we can add: A psychologist must be more than a
psychologist. First of all, he must be a philosopher.
What would be the result if our laboratory had moved to the
naturalistic headquarters? It would be the beginning of a complete
separation from philosophy. Our graduate students would flock to
psychological research work without even being aware that without
philosophical training they are mere dilettantes. And soon enough a
merely psychological doctorate would be demanded. I do not deny at
all that such pure psychologists would find enough to do; I should
doubt only whether they know what they are doing. There are too many
psychologists already who go their way so undisturbed only because they
walk like somnambulists on the edge of the roof; they do not even see
the real problem; they do not see the depths to which they may fall.
But does the laboratory itself gain from such divorce? Just the
contrary. It is evident that everywhere in the world where the
psychological laboratory turns to natural science, the experiments
deal mostly with sensation, perception, and reaction; while those
laboratories which keep their friendship with epistemology emphasize
the higher mental functions, experimenting on attention, memory,
association, feeling, emotion, thought, and so on. But is it not clear
that only the latter work gives to the psychological laboratory a real
right to existence, as the former is almost completely overlapped by
the well-established interests of the physiologists? If psychology
cannot do anything else than that which physiologists like Helmholtz,
Hering, Kries, Mach, Bowditch, and the rest have always done so
successfully, then experimental psychology had better give up the trade
and leave the study of the mind to the students of the organism.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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