Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3)Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Philosophy
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3)
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Philosophy -- History
the forms of ordinary conception. For instance, appearances of the body
or of nature, which are perceptible by the senses, are brought forward
along with thoughts regarding them, which do not nearly so completely
exhaust the subject as if it had been thoroughly thought out, and the
Notion allowed to pursue an independent course.
Looking at this as it bears on the question of how Plato’s philosophy
is to be apprehended, we find, owing to these two circumstances, that
either too much or too little is found in it. Too much is found by the
ancients, the so-called -, who sometimes dealt with Plato’s philosophy
as they dealt with the Greek mythology. This they allegorized and
represented as the expression of ideas—which the myths certainly
are—and in the same way they first raised the ideas in Plato’s myths
to the rank of theorems: for the merit of Philosophy consists alone in
the fact that truth is expressed in the form of the Notion. Sometimes,
again, they took what with Plato is in the form of the Notion for the
expression of Absolute Being—the theory of Being in the Parmenides, for
instance, for the knowledge of God—just as if Plato had not himself
drawn a distinction between them. But in the pure Notions of Plato the
ordinary conception as such is not abrogated; either it is not said
that these Notions constitute its reality, or they are to Plato no more
than a conception, and not reality. Again, we certainly see that too
little is found in Plato by the moderns in particular; for they attach
themselves pre-eminently to the side of the ordinary conception, and
see in it reality. What in Plato relates to the Notion, or what is
purely speculative, is nothing more in their eyes than roaming about
in abstract logical notions, or than empty subtleties: on the other
hand, they take that for theorem which was enunciated as a popular
conception. Thus we find in Tennemann (Vol. II. p. 376) and others an
obstinate determination to lead back the Platonic Philosophy to the
forms of our former metaphysic, _e.g._ to the proof of the existence of
God.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account