Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3)Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3)
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Philosophy -- History
β. Bruno, who asserts the final cause to be immediately operative, and
the life immanent in the universe, asserts it also to be existent,
as substance; he is therefore opposed to the conception of a merely
extra-mundane understanding. To a certain extent Bruno distinguishes
form and matter in substance, which itself, as the aforesaid activity
of the Idea, is the unity of form and matter; thus matter has life in
itself. The permanent element in the endless changes of existence is,
he says, the first and absolute matter; although without form, it is
nevertheless the mother of all forms, and receptive of all forms. Because
matter is not without the first universal form, it is itself principle
or in itself final cause. Form is immanent in matter; the one simply
cannot exist without the other; thus matter itself brings about these
changes of form, and the same matter runs through them all. What was at
first seed becomes blade, then ear, then bread, chyle, blood, seed of
animal, an embryo, a human being, a corpse, then once more earth, stone,
or other substance; from sand and water frogs are produced. Here then
we can perceive something which, although it transforms itself into all
these things in turn, yet still in itself remains one and the same. This
matter cannot be a body, for bodies have form; nor can it belong to the
class which we term properties, attributes, or qualities, for these are
liable to change. Thus nothing seems to be eternal and worthy of the name
of a principle, except matter. Many have for this reason held matter to
be the only reality, and all forms to be accidental. This error arises
from the fact of their recognizing only a form of the second kind, and
not that necessary first and eternal form, which is the form and source
of all forms. In the same way the aforesaid matter, on account of its
identity with the understanding which causes form beforehand, is itself
intelligible, as the universal presupposition of all corporeality.
Because it is everything in general, it is nothing in particular, neither
air nor water, nor anything else, abstract or otherwise; it has no
dimensions, in order to have all dimensions. The forms of matter are the
inward power of matter itself; it is, as intelligible, the very totality
of form.[76] This system of Bruno’s is thus objective Spinozism, and
nothing else; one can see how deeply he penetrated.
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