Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3)Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3)
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Philosophy -- History
as the finest example of how men can learn to know nature by means of
experiments and conclusions derived from experiments, they may also serve
as an example of how we should neither experiment nor draw conclusions,
of how nothing at all can be learned. A miserable kind of experience
like this itself contradicts itself through nature, for nature is more
excellent than it appears in this wretched experience: both nature itself
and experience, when carried a little further, contradict it. Hence,
of all the splendid discoveries of Newton in optics, none now remain
excepting one—the division of light into seven colours. This is partly
because the conception of whole and part come into play, and partly from
an obdurate closing of the eyes to the opposite side. From this empirical
method in Philosophy, we shall now pass on to Leibnitz.
C. THIRD SECTION.
The third development of the philosophy of the understanding is that
represented by Leibnitz and Wolff. If Wolff’s metaphysics is divested of
its rigid form, we have as a result the later popular philosophy.
1. LEIBNITZ.
As in other respects Leibnitz represents the extreme antithesis to
Newton, so in respect of philosophy he presents a striking contrast to
Locke and his empiricism, and also to Spinoza. He upholds thought as
against the perception of the English school, and in lieu of sensuous
Being he maintains Being for thought to be the essence of truth, just as
Boehme at an earlier time upheld implicit Being. While Spinoza asserted
the universality, the oneness of substance merely, and while with Locke
we saw infinite determinations made the basis, Leibnitz, by means of
his fundamental principle of individuality, brings out the essentiality
of the opposite aspect of Spinoza’s philosophy, existence for self, the
monad, but the monad regarded as the absolute Notion, though perhaps
not yet as the “I.” The opposed principles, which were forced asunder,
find their completion in each other, since Leibnitz’s principle of
individuation completed Spinoza’s system as far as outward aspect goes.
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