Classical literature; Greece -- History -- Peloponnesian War, 431-404 B.C.; Greece -- History -- Spartan and Theban Supremacies, 404-362 B.C.
When the enemy saw them so unexpectedly approaching, not one of them
was able to maintain tranquility: some began running to their divisions,
some fell into line, some might be seen bitting and bridling their
horses, some donning their cuirasses, and one and all were like men
about to receive rather than to inflict a blow. He, the while, with
steady impetus pushed forward his armament, like a ship-of-war prow
forward. Wherever he brought his solid wedge to bear, he meant to cleave
through the opposing mass, and crumble his adversary's host to pieces.
With this design he prepared to throw the brunt of the fighting on the
strongest half of his army, while he kept the weaker portion of it in
the background, knowing certainly that if worsted it would only cause
discouragement to his own division and add force to the foe. The cavalry
on the side of his opponents were disposed like an ordinary phalanx
of heavy infantry, regular in depth and unsupported by foot-soldiers
interspersed among the horses. (14) Epaminondas again differed in
strengthening the attacking point of his cavalry, besides which he
interspersed footmen between their lines in the belief that, when he
had once cut through the cavalry, he would have wrested victory from the
antagonist along his whole line; so hard is it to find troops who will
care to keep their own ground when once they see any of their own side
flying. Lastly, to prevent any attempt on the part of the Athenians, who
were on the enemy's left wing, to bring up their reliefs in support of
the portion next them, he posted bodies of cavalry and heavy infantry on
certain hillocks in front of them, intending to create in their minds an
apprehension that, in case they offered such assistance, they would be
attacked on their own rear by these detachments. Such was the plan of
encounter which he formed and executed; nor was he cheated in his hopes.
He had so much the mastery at his point of attack that he caused the
whole of the enemy's troops to take flight.
(14) See Rustow and Kochly, p. 176; and for the {amippoi}
Harpocration, s.v.; Pollus, i. 131; "Hipparch." v. 13; Thuc. v.
58; Herod. vii. 158; Caes. "B. G." i. 48; "B. Civ." iii. 84.
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