Herbert Hoover: The Man and His WorkKellogg, Vernon L. (Vernon Lyman)
History
Herbert Hoover: The Man and His Work
Kellogg, Vernon L. (Vernon Lyman)
Hoover, Herbert, 1874-1964; World War, 1914-1918 -- Food supply
Take the case of potatoes; here is an unstandardized, seasonal
commodity, with no national market and therefore no established daily
price as a datum point. A grower in Florida, Maine, or Wisconsin,
through a local agent, or through local sale, consigns potatoes to
Pittsburgh because a larger price is reported there than in Chicago. The
grower can usually make no actual sale to an actual retailer or
wholesaler at destination because the buyer has no assurance of quality.
Coincident shipment from many points to a hopeful market almost daily
produces a local glut at receiving points somewhere in the country.
Often enough the shipper gets no return but a bill for freight and the
perishables sometimes rot in the yards. If potatoes were standardized
and sold on contract in national market, protected from manipulation,
three things should result. First, there would be a daily national price
known to growers. Second, by the sale of a contract for delivery the
grower would be assured of this price. Third, the contract and
directions for shipment would flow naturally to the distributor where
the potatoes were needed, and thus the present fearfully wasteful system
would be mitigated. Potatoes would be a most difficult case to handle;
dried beans, peas, even butter and cheese would be easier. I am not
advocating widespread dealing in futures, but short contracts giving
time for delivery would probably greatly decrease the margin between
farmer and local distributor by saving great wastes in transport, in
spoilage and in manipulation.
The second class of speculation is one largely of the war as a period of
rising prices growing out of inflation, and so forth. It lies in the
marking up of goods on the shelf to the level of the rising daily
market. This marking up has been one of the large factors in increasing
the margin during the war. No better example exists than the rise of
flour during the 1916-1917 harvest year, referred to elsewhere. We shall
have a remedy for this the moment the tide of inflation turns. The
farmer and consumer cannot, however, expect that they will get even
during such a reverse period for their losses on the rise, because the
trades have too great an individual power of resistance against selling
goods at a loss. Anyway, the marking up of goods will cease when prices
cease to rise--and there is a limit.
The third class of speculation is wholly vicious. That is the purchase
of foodstuffs, in times of rising economic levels, sheerly for the rise
in price or the deliberate manipulation of markets during normal times.
These operations are against the common welfare; they can find no moral
or economic justification. They are not to be reached by prosecution;
they must be reached by prevention. Our great boards of trade in fine
patriotic spirit proved their ability during the war to control
deliberate manipulation of grain and other futures.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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