Heresy: Its Utility And Morality. A Plea And A JustificationBradlaugh, Charles
Religion
Heresy: Its Utility And Morality. A Plea And A Justification
Bradlaugh, Charles
Free thought; Heresy
As Descartes and Spinoza had been foremost on the continent, so was
Locke in England, and no sketch of the progress of heresy during the
seventeenth century would be deserving serious regard which did not
accord a prominent place to John Locke, whom G. H. Lewes calls "one of
the wisest of Englishmen," and of whom Buckle speaks as "an innovator in
his philosophy, and an Unitarian in his creed." He was born in 1632,
and died 1704. Locke, according to his own fashion, was a sincere and
earnest Christian; but this has not saved him from being furiously
assailed for the materialistic character of his philosophy, and many
have been ready to assert that Locke's principles "lead to Atheism." In
politics Locke laid down, that unjust and unlawful force on the part of
the government might and ought to be resisted by force on the part of
the citizens. He urged that on questions of theology there ought to
be no penalties consequent upon the reception or rejection of any
particular religious opinion. How far those were right who regarded
Locke's metaphysical reasoning as; dangerous to orthodoxy may be, judged
by the following extract on the origin of ideas:--: "Follow a child from
its birth and observe the alterations that time makes, and you shall
find, as the mind by the senses comes more and more to be furnished with
ideas, it comes to be more and more awake; thinks more, the more it
has matter to think on. After some time, it begins to know the objects,
which being most familiar with it, have made lasting impressions. Thus
it comes, by degrees, to know the persons it daily converses with, and
distinguish them from strangers; which are instances and effects of its
coming to retain and distinguish the ideas the senses convey to it;
and so we may observe, how the mind, by degrees improves in these,
and advances to the exercise of those other faculties of enlarging,
compounding, and abstracting its ideas, and of reasoning about them, and
reflecting upon all these.
"If it shall be demanded then, when a man begins to have any ideas? I
think the true answer is, when he first has any sensation. For since
there appear not to be any ideas in the mind, before the senses have
conveyed any in, I conceive that ideas in the understanding are coeval
with sensation; which is such an impression or emotion, made in some
part of the body, as produces some perception in the understanding. It
is about these impressions made on our senses by outward objects, that
the mind seems first to employ itself in such operations as we call
perception, remembering, consideration, reasoning, &c.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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