History as past ethics; an introduction to the history of moralsMyers, P. V. N. (Philip Van Ness)
Philosophy
History as past ethics; an introduction to the history of morals
Myers, P. V. N. (Philip Van Ness)
Ethics -- History
Yet notwithstanding the loftiness and nobility of much of Plato’s
ethical thought, still, like Socrates, he stood almost wholly on
Greek ground. His ethics is scarcely more than a justification of
the common Greek morality of his time. He destroys the family in the
interest of the state; he approves of the exposition of ill-formed,
unpromising infants; he makes morality to be a class thing--only select
and cultured souls are with him capable of genuine virtue. He accepts
slavery as a necessary institution of the state; he practically shuts
out the non-Greek world from the sphere of morality;[505] and with
the common Greek he believes that to do evil to one’s enemies is an
imperative duty.[506] Nor does Plato, like Hebrew seer, rise high
enough above the general Greek viewpoint to discern the great law of
moral progress, and to prevision the historical goal--ethical world
unity.
[Sidenote: Aristotle and his
ethics]
Aristotle makes Plato’s classification of the virtues the basis of
his well-rounded system of ethics. In one important respect, however,
he differs from Plato; he did not believe that knowledge of the right
necessarily leads to its practice. He recognized the fact that man
though knowing the good often perversely follows evil.
The great defect of Aristotelian ethics is its failure to rise to the
ethical conception of collective humanity. In the moral inequality
of men, which he assumes as the presupposition of his ethics, he even
exaggerated the common Greek view. He divided men so rigorously into
classes with varying grades of moral capacity that his moral system was
ethically like the caste system of the Indian Brahmans. To affirm the
moral equality of men seemed to him to be a species of treason against
the true humanity, a crime against Greek civilization.
According to Aristotle the slave was a being so morally different
from the freeman as to constitute practically another species. He was
not wholly incapable of virtue, but could practice only such servile
virtues as obedience and humility. The last, though a virtue in a
slave, was in a freeman an unworthy weakness.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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