History of a literary radical, and other essaysBourne, Randolph Silliman
General
History of a literary radical, and other essays
Bourne, Randolph Silliman
American essays -- 20th century
To render dogma infallible is to make it something that no longer
has to be fought for. This attitude ultimately undermines the whole
structure for belief. If it is only infallible ideas that we are to
believe, then belief loses all its moral force. It is no longer a
fierce struggle to maintain one’s intellectual position. Nothing is
at stake. One is not braced in faith with the hosts of hell assailing
one’s citadel. To the puritan, belief meant something to be gloweringly
and tenaciously held against the world, the flesh and the devil. But
Catholic belief, in the Newman atmosphere, is too sheltered, too safely
insured, to count excitingly. One only yawns over it, as his own deep
soul must have secretly yawned over it, and turns aside to the genuine
issues of life. But this is just what we should do with belief. We are
passing out of the faith era, and belief, as an intellectual attitude,
has almost ceased to play an active part in our life. In the scientific
attitude there is no place whatever for belief. We have no right to
“believe” anything unless it has been experimentally proved. But if it
has been proved, then we do not say we “believe” it, because this would
imply that an alternative was possible. All we do is to register our
common assent to the new truth’s incontrovertibility. Nor has belief
any place in the loose, indecisive issues of ordinary living. We have
to act constantly on insufficient evidence, on the best “opinion” we
can get. But opinion is not belief, and we are lost if we treat it so.
Belief is dogmatic, but opinion has value only when it is tentative,
questioning. The fact is that in modern thinking the attitude of belief
has given place to what may be called the higher plausibility. Stern,
rugged conviction which has no scientific background behind it is
coming to be dealt with rather impatiently by the modern mind. We have
difficulty in distinguishing it from prejudice. There is no hostility
to faith, if by “faith” we only mean an emotional core of desire
driving towards some ideal. But idealism is a very different thing from
belief. Belief is impelled from behind; it is sterile, fixed. Belief
has no seeds of progress, no constructive impulse. An ideal, on the
other hand, is an illumined end towards which our hopes and endeavors
converge. It looks forward and pulls us along with it. It is ideals and
not beliefs that motivate the modern mind. It is meaningless to say
that we “believe” in our ideals. This separates our ideals from us. But
what they are is just the push of our temperaments towards perfection.
They are what is most inseparably and intrinsically ourselves. The
place of a belief which put truth outside of us and made virtue a hard
clinging to it has been taken by the idealism which merges us with the
growing end we wish to achieve.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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