White used his influence to encourage what may be called _live natural history_, which, as he understood it, "abounds in anecdote[22] and circumstance." He bids his correspondents to "learn as much as possible the manners of animals; they are worth a ream of descriptions." His example has done more than his exhortations. He focusses a keen eye upon any new or little-known animal, such as the noctule, the harvest-mouse, or the mole-cricket; detects natural contrivances little, if at all, noticed before, such as the protective resemblance of the stone-curlew's young; dwells upon the practical applications of natural history, such as the action of earthworms in promoting the fertility of soils; and combines facts which a dull man would be careful to put into separate pigeon-holes, such as the different ways in which a squirrel, a field-mouse, and a nuthatch extract the kernels of hazel-nuts. The many amateurs of the eighteenth century naturally demanded books written to suit them, and illustrated books with coloured plates, coming out in parts, found a ready sale. Some were devoted to insects, others to microscopic objects. In accordance with prevalent belief, the writers made a point of tracing the hand of Providence in the minutest organisms; many popular treatises were altogether devoted to natural theology. Some few of these natural history miscellanies contained original work, which has not yet lost its interest. The best is Roesel's _Insecten-belustigungen_ (four vols. 4to., 1746-61), memorable among other things for containing the original description of Amœba. For English readers Henry Baker wrote _The Microscope Made Easy_ (1743) and _Employment for the Microscope_ (1753). Intelligence and Instinct in the Lower Animals. The period with which we are now concerned (1741-1789) initiated the profitable discussion of the mental powers of animals. We are unable for lack of space to follow the investigation from period to period, and must condense into one short section whatever its history suggests. In the year 1660 Aristotelians were still discoursing about the vegetative and sensitive souls which bridged the gulf between inanimate matter and the thinking man. Descartes had tried to prove that the bodies of men and animals are machines actuated by springs like watches. Man, however, according to Descartes, possesses a soul wholly different in its properties from his body, and apparently incapable of being acted upon by it. Man only can think; animals are capable only of physical sensations, and have no consciousness. Into speculations like these we shall not venture, being- content, like Locke, "to sit down in quiet ignorance of those things which upon examination are proved to be beyond the reach of our capacities." We shall merely note here and there facts ascertained by observation or experiment, and plain inferences drawn from such facts.